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Abstract
We define and characterize the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria of coordination games with
pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated
outcomes. Renegotiation-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of qual-
itatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria in such games. They are such that players never mis-
coordinate, play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only
the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, they are robust to changes in players’ beliefs,
interim Pareto efficient, and evolutionarily stable.
Keywords: coordination games, renegotiation-proofness, equilibrium entrants, secret handshake,
incomplete information, evolutionary robustness. JEL codes: C72, C73, D82
1 Introduction
We define and characterize renegotiation-proof equilibria for a class of coordination games with
pre-play cheap-talk communication in which agents have private information about what action they
would prefer to coordinate on. An equilibrium is renegotiation-proof if, after the communication and
given the information that this reveals, players never have a joint deviation into a Pareto-improving
equilibrium (where the deviation may rely on additional communication). We are interested in two
typical kinds of situations for which renegotiation proofness is the appropriate solution concept,
albeit for different reasons in the two situations.
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The first kind of situation is one in which agents are sophisticated and keep (strategically) com-
municating until they reach a mutually beneficial solution. Renegotiation-proofness is defined to
capture this idea, very much as in the literature on contract theory (Hart and Tirole, 1988) or re-
peated games (Farrell and Maskin, 1989). As an example consider a situation of two firms trying
to collude by implementing a market-sharing agreement by which one firm sells in certain regions
whereas the rivals sell in other regions, and each firm has private information about which regions
they would prefer to serve.
The second kind of situation is one in which communication is feasible and in which behavior
is governed by a long-run learning (or evolutionary) process. Renegotiation-proofness here corre-
sponds to a requirement of evolutionary stability at an interim level, when agents can experiment
with new behavior that is contingent on the use of additional communication (Robson, 1990). As
an example consider the problem of two pedestrians suddenly finding themselves face-to-face and
trying to get past each other, when they have private information about the direction they want to
take after the encounter.
It is unclear whether players can achieve coordination in such incomplete-information settings,
how efficient it is if they do, and how communication is used to achieve it. Coordination games with
pre-play communication, in fact, have a wide range of qualitatively very different equilibria. Among
these are babbling equilibria with a high likelihood of miscoordination that are evolutionarily stable
in the absence of communication, and equilibria in which agents reveal some information about the
intensity of their preferences and yet often miscoordinate.
Yet, despite all this, players manage to coordinate in at least some such situations. Considering
an instance of our first example, we note that firms “competing” in the 1997 series of regional FCC
auctions allocating licenses for slices of the electromagnetic spectrum were able to use the very
limited public communication possibilities of the trailing digits of their bids to reveal information on
their preferred regions in order to successfully coordinate to collude (Cramton and Schwartz, 2000).1
Players also typically coordinate effectively in our second example: Casual observation suggests
that pedestrians typically are able to avoid bumping into each other, even though there is no uni-
form social norm such as “always stay on the right” as there is for cars (Young, 1998). Moreover,
pedestrians often use brief nonverbal communication to signal their preferred direction (e.g., a slight
movement to the left or right, a tilt of the head, a glance in a certain direction), and the (coordinated)
direction in which they pass each other depends on this communication.2
We show that renegotiation-proof equilibria have a very specific structure that is consistent with
1In fact, the result of this paper that binary communication is all that is needed for successful coordination provides
another argument against allowing even a brief form of explicit communication between oligopolistic competitors.
2The example is motivated by Goffman (1971, Chapter 1, p. 6): “Take, for example, techniques that pedestrians
employ in order to avoid bumping into one another. [...] There are an appreciable number of such devices; they are
constantly in use and they cast a pattern on street behavior. Street traffic would be a shambles without them.”
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these casual observations. We show that a strategy is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium if and only
if it satisfies the following three key properties: players never miscoordinate, they play their jointly
preferred outcome whenever there is one, and they communicate the ordinal part of their preferences
(i.e., communicate their preferred outcome without revealing any information on the intensity of
their preferences).
Thus, communication in a renegotiation-proof equilibrium induces the agents to endogenously
face games in which their ordinal preferences are common knowledge. In those cases in which
agents agree about the optimal joint action, they coordinate efficiently, i.e., on the action that both
prefer. In cases in which they disagree, they still coordinate, but, as the coordinated outcome is not
determined by the players’ cardinal preferences, this coordination is generally not ex-ante efficient.
We also show that renegotiation-proof equilibria do not depend on the distribution of private
preferences or on the exact timing of the renegotiation (relative to the communication), and are thus
robust to changes in players’ (first- or higher-order) beliefs, interim Pareto efficient, and evolution-
arily stable in the traditional sense.
Relationship to the literature Game theorists have long recognized that coordination is an im-
portant aspect of successful economic and social interaction, that it requires an explanation even
in complete-information coordination games, and that it does not occur in all circumstances.3 One
possible explanation for some, fairly simple,examples of coordination is the concept of a focal point,
due to Schelling (1960), which is, loosely speaking, a strategy profile that jumps out at players as
clearly the right way to play a game.4
Perhaps one of the situations in which we most plausibly expect coordination is when people
play the same coordination game many times with different people and there is some evolutionary
(or learning) process. This approach is already present in the “mass action” interpretation of equi-
librium given by Nash (1950), and then taken up more formally in Maynard Smith and Price (1973)
who define the notion of evolutionary stability.5 It is well known that all pure equilibria in coordi-
nation games are evolutionarily stable (whereas mixed equilibria are not stable). This literature thus
supports the view that while play in the long run will be coordinated, it is not necessarily efficiently
coordinated.6
Another explanation for coordination is that it is achieved through communication, even if it is
3 Evidence for miscoordination in lab experiments is reported by, e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990),
Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994), and Blume and Gneezy (2010). According to Farrell and Klemperer (2007, Sec-
tion 3.4) miscoordination also occurs regularly in real-life economic interactions.
4Different attempts at formalizing focal points are given in, e.g., Sugden (1995) and Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2013).
5See, e.g., Weibull (1995) and Sandholm (2010) for a textbook treatment of the large literature on evolutionary game
theory following these.
6Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) show that in the very long run and under persistent low-
probability errors an evolutionary (learning) process leads to the risk-dominant, not necessarily Pareto-dominant, pure
strategy equilibrium in two-by-two coordination games.
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simply cheap talk as in Crawford and Sobel (1982). Early seminal contributions in this direction are
Farrell (1987) and Rabin (1994). Communication alone, however, only adds equilibria: the equilibria
of the game without communication “survive” the introduction of communication as babbling equi-
libria. The problem, therefore, of how play focuses on the coordinated (and perhaps among those the
most efficient) equilibria does not go away, and one can again appeal to one of the above-mentioned
criteria to explain why this might happen.
There is a literature that studies the evolutionary outcome of coordination games with pre-play
cheap talk, initiated by Robson (1990). If play is stuck in an inferior equilibrium, a small group of
experimenting agents can recognize each other by means of a “secret handshake” and play Pareto-
optimal strategy with each other and the inferior equilibrium strategy with agents who are not part
of this group, thereby outperforming the agents outside the group.
All the above-mentioned literature (on coordination) focuses on complete-information games.
However, one of the main reasons why people communicate is that they have privately known pref-
erences that they feel useful to share at least partially before finally choosing actions, as seen in the
above examples. One of the main stumbling blocks of studying how communication helps achieve
coordination in the presence of incomplete information is that it “requires overcoming formidable
multiple-equilibrium problems” (Crawford and Haller, 1990, p. 592). With our characterization
result we show that the plausible refinement of renegotiation-proofness equilibria removes this mul-
tiplicity problem to a large extent.
Baseline model and robustness checks While we take into account incomplete information in
the coordination problem, we try to keep the baseline model tractable by simplifying other aspects
of the problem. We restrict attention in the baseline model to (incomplete information) two-player
two-action (coded as left and right) coordination problems, in which every type has a coordination
concern. Different types only differ in how much they prefer coordination on one action over the
other one. Players can communicate only once (by sending a message from a large finite set) before
the game is played.
Section 8 provides a series of extensions and robustness checks of our baseline model. First, we
show that all our results hold for any length of pre-play communication. Next, we extend our key
results to general (possibly asymmetric) coordination games, which might involve more than two
players and more than two actions. Finally, we study a variant of our baseline model in which a
few types have dominant actions. We show that in this setup, there is a unique renegotiation-proof
equilibrium strategy among the strategies satisfying our three key properties (the identity of this
unique strategy depends on the distribution of types with dominant actions).
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Structure Section 2 presents our baseline model. Section 3 defines Bayesian Nash equilibria and
the three key properties that renegotiation-proof equilibria have. Section 4 defines the concept of
renegotiation-proofness appropriately adapted to our incomplete-information strategic setting. Sec-
tion 5 presents the main result and a sketch of its proof. Section 6 discusses the efficiency properties
of renegotiation-proof equilibria. Section 7 discusses additional notions of evolutionary stability be-
yond the secret-handshake stability implied by renegotiation-proofness. Section 8 provides a series
of robustness checks and extensions. Section 9 concludes. The formal proofs are presented in the
appendices. Appendices C–E are presented in the online supplementary material.
2 Model
We consider a setup in which two agents with private idiosyncratic preferences play a two-action
coordination game that is preceded by pre-play cheap talk. Extensions are presented in Section 8.
Players and types There are two players in ex-ante symmetric positions. Players can choose one
of two actions, L and R. Each player has a privately known “value” or “type.” The two players’
values are independently drawn from a common atomless distribution with a continuous cumulative
distribution function F with a full support on the unit interval U = [0,1] and with density f (i.e.,
f (u)> 0 for each u ∈U ).
Payoff matrix For any realized pair of types, u and v, the players play a coordination game given
by the following payoff matrix, where the first entry is the payoff of the player of type u (choosing
row) and the second entry is the payoff of the player of type v (choosing column).
Table 1: Payoff Matrix of the Coordination Game
Type v
L R
Type u
L 1-u, 1-v 0, 0
R 0, 0 u, v
We call this game the coordination game without communication and denote it by Γ.
Remark 1. Our results are similar without assuming full support. The only difference is that without
full support renegotiation-proofness implies binary communication only of messages that are used
with positive probability, while with full support it implies binary communication also of unused
messages, which yields the exact “iff” characterization of the renegotiation-proofness in Theorem 1.
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Pre-play communication After learning their type, but before playing this coordination game, the
two players each simultaneously send a publicly observable message from a finite set of messages
M (satisfying 2 ≤ |M| < ∞), where ∆(M) is the set of all probability distributions over messages in
M. We assume that messages are costless. We call the game, so amended, the coordination game
with communication and denote it by 〈Γ,M〉.
Strategies A player’s (ex-ante) strategy in the coordination game with communication is then a
pair σ = (µ,ξ ), where µ :U → ∆(M) is a (Lebesgue measurable) message function that describes
which (possibly random) message is sent for each possible realization of the agent’s type, and ξ :
M×M→U is an action function that describes the maximal type (cutoff type) that chooses L as a
function of the observed message profile; that is, when an agent who follows strategy (µ,ξ ) observes
a message profile (m,m′) (message m sent by the agent, and message m′ sent by the opponent),
then the agent plays L if her type u is at most ξ (m,m′) (i.e., if u ≤ ξ (m,m′)), and she plays R if
u > ξ (m,m′). (The choice that the threshold type plays L does not affect our analysis, given the
assumption of F being atomless.)
Let Σ be the set of all strategies in the game 〈Γ,M〉.
Remark 2. In principle, we should allow more general action functions ξ :U×M×M→△{L,R},
which specify the probability that an agent chooses L as a function of the observed message profile
and the agent’s type. It is simple to see, however, and proven in Lemma 1 in Appendix A.1, that
any “generalized” strategy is dominated by a strategy that uses a cutoff action function in the second
stage. The intuition, is that following the observation of any pair of messages, lower types always
gain more (less) than higher types from choosing L (R). We thus simplify our notation by considering
only cutoff action functions of the form ξ :M×M→U .
Let µu (m) denote the probability, given message function µ , that a player sends messagem if she
is of type u. Let µ¯ (m) = IEu [µu (m)] be the mean probability that a player of a random type sends
message m (where the expectation is taken with respect to F). Let supp(µ¯) = {m ∈M | µ¯ (m)> 0}
denote the support of µ¯ . With a slight abuse of notation we write ξ (m,m′) = L when all types (who
send message m with positive probability) play L (i.e., when ξ (m,m′) ≥ sup(u ∈U |µu (m)> 0)),
and we write ξ (m,m′) = R when all types play R (i.e., when ξ (m,m′)≤ inf(u ∈U |µu (m)> 0)).
3 Equilibrium Strategies
We here define the standard notion of (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium strategies, present properties that
renegotiation-proof equilibria turn out to have, and present examples of equilibria in the coordination
game with communication with and without these properties.
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Given a strategy profile (σ ,σ ′) and a type profile u,v∈U , let piu,v (σ ,σ ′) denote the interim (pre-
communication) expected payoff of a player of type u who follows strategy σ and faces an opponent
of type v who follows strategy σ ′. Formally, for σ = (µ,ξ ) and σ ′ = (µ ′,ξ ′),
piu,v
(
σ ,σ ′
)
= ∑
m∈M
∑
m′∈M
µu (m)µv
(
m′
)(
(1−u)1{u≤ξ (m,m′)}1{v≤ξ ′(m′,m)} + u1{u>ξ (m,m′)}1{v>ξ ′(m′,m)}
)
,
where 1{x} is the indicator function equal to 1 if statement x is true and zero otherwise. Let
piu
(
σ ,σ ′
)
= IEv
[
piu,v
(
σ ,σ ′
)]
≡
∫ 1
v=0
piu,v
(
σ ,σ ′
)
f (v)dv
denote the expected interim payoff of a player of type uwho follows strategy σ and faces an opponent
with a random type who follows strategy σ ′. Finally, let,
pi
(
σ ,σ ′
)
= IEu
[
piu
(
σ ,σ ′
)]
≡
∫ 1
u=0
piu
(
σ ,σ ′
)
f (u)du
denote the ex-ante expected payoff of an agent who uses strategy σ against strategy σ ′.
A strategy σ is a (symmetric Bayesian Nash) equilibrium strategy if piu (σ ,σ) ≥ piu (σ ′,σ) for
each u ∈U and each strategy σ ′ ∈ Σ. Let E ⊆ Σ denote the set of all equilibrium strategies of 〈Γ,M〉.
Three key properties We call a strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) ∈ Σ mutual-preference consistent if whenever
u,v< 1/2 then ξ (m,m′) = ξ (m′,m) = L for all m ∈ supp(µu) and all m′ ∈ supp(µv) and if whenever
u,v> 1/2 then ξ (m,m′) = ξ (m′,m) = R for all m ∈ supp(µu) and all m′ ∈ supp(µv). That is, players
with the same ordinal preference coordinate on their mutually preferred outcome.
We call a strategy coordinated if ξ (m,m′) = ξ (m′,m) ∈ {L,R} for any pair of messages m,m′ ∈
supp(µ¯). A coordinated strategy never leads to miscoordination after any (used) message pair.
For any message m ∈M, define the expected probability of a player’s opponent playing L con-
ditional on the player sending message m ∈M and the opponent following strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) ∈ Σ,
as
β σ (m) =
∫ 1
u=0
∑
m′∈supp(µu)
µu(m
′)1{u≤ξ (m′,m)} f (u)du.
We say that strategy σ has binary communication if there are two numbers 0≤ β σ ≤ β
σ
≤ 1 such
that for all messages m ∈M we have β σ (m) ∈ [β σ ,β
σ
], for all messages m ∈M such that there is
a type u< 1/2 with µu(m) > 0 we have β σ (m) = β
σ
, and for all messages m ∈M such that there is
a type u > 1/2 with µu(m) > 0 we have β σ (m) = β
σ . That is, binary communication implies that
players (essentially) use just two kinds of messages: any message sent by types u< 0.5 induces the
same consequence of maximizing the probability of the opponent playing L, and any message sent by
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types u> 0.5 induces the opposite consequence of maximizing the opponent’s probability of playing
R. Note that, as defined here, a strategy with no communication also has binary communication (in
which the player’s message does not affect the probability of the partner playing L).
In Appendix B we show that no single one of these three properties is implied by the other two.
Clearly, a strategy that has binary communication and is coordinated must be an equilibrium. In
Appendix B we also show that no combination of any two of these three properties implies that a
strategy is an equilibrium.
Consider a strategy that is coordinated and mutual-preference consistent and has binary commu-
nication. The first two properties determine the behavior of agents with the same ordinal preferences
(i.e., when both types are below 1⁄2, or both above 1⁄2). The property of binary communication, then,
implies that the probability with which the players coordinate on L, conditional on having different
ordinal preferences (i.e., conditional on one player having type u < 1/2 and the other player having
type v > 1/2), is independent on the message sent by the player. We denote this probability by ασ ,
and refer to it as the left tendency of the strategy. We can express β and β
σ
as follows:
β σ = F(1/2)ασ and β
σ
= F(1/2)+(1−F(1/2))ασ .
The first equality (β σ = F(1/2)ασ ) is implied by the fact that when any type u> 1/2 sends a message
expressing her preference for coordination on R, the players coordinate on L only if the opponent’s
preferred outcome is L (which happens with a probability of F(1/2)), and they then coordinate on
L with a probability of ασ . The second equality (β
σ
= F(1/2)+ (1−F(1/2))ασ ) is implied by the
fact that when any type u < 1/2 sends a message expressing her preference for coordination on L,
the players coordinate on L with probability one if the opponent’s preferred outcome is L, and they
coordinate on L with a probability of ασ if the opponent’s preferred action is R.
Remark 3. The set of strategies with the above three properties (coordination, mutual-preference
consistency, and binary communication) is essentially one-dimensional because the left tendency
ασ ∈ [0,1] of such a strategy σ describes all payoff-relevant aspects. Two strategies with the same
left tendency can only differ in the way in which the players implement the joint lottery when they
have different preferred outcomes, but these implementation differences are nonessential, as the
probability of the joint lottery inducing the players to coordinate on L remains the same.
Examples of equilibria satisfying all properties The following strategies, denoted by σL, σR, and
σC, are prime examples (that play a special role in later sections) of strategies that are all mutual-
preference consistent, coordinated, and have binary communication.
The strategies σL and σR are given by the pairs (µ∗,ξL) and (µ∗,ξR), respectively. The message
function µ∗ has the property that there are messages mL,mR ∈M such that message mL indicates a
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preference for L and mR a preference for R, and the action functions ξL and ξR are defined as follows:
µ∗ (u) =

mL u≤
1
2
mR u>
1
2 .
ξL
(
m,m′
)
=

R m= m
′ =mR
L otherwise,
ξR
(
m,m′
)
=

L m= m
′ = mL
R otherwise.
This means that the “fallback norm” of σL (which is applied when the agents have different
preferred outcomes) is to coordinate on L, while that of σR is to coordinate on R. In other words the
left tendency of σL is one and the left tendency of σR is zero.
Strategy σC = (µC,ξC) has the “fallback norm” of using a joint lottery to choose the coordinated
outcome. Each agent simultaneously sends a random bit and the coordinated outcome depends on
whether the random bits are equal or not.
Assume that |M| ≥ 4. We denote four distinct messages by mL,0,mL,1,mR,0,mR,1 ∈M, where we
interpret the first subscript (R or L) as the agent’s preferred direction, and the second subscript (0 or
1) as a random binary number chosen with probability 1/2 each by the agent. Formally, the message
function µC is defined as follows:
µC (u) =


1
2mL,0⊕
1
2mL,1 u≤
1
2
1
2mR,0⊕
1
2mR,1 u>
1
2 ,
where αm⊕ (1−α)m′ is a lottery with a probability of α on message m and 1−α on message m′.
In the second stage, if both agents share the same preferred outcome they play it. Otherwise,
they coordinate on L if their random numbers differ, and coordinate on R otherwise. Formally:
ξC
(
m,m′
)
=


R (m,m′) ∈ {(mR,0,mR,0) ,(mR,0,mR,1) ,(mR,0,mL,0) ,(mR,1,mL,1)
(mR,1,mR,1) ,(mR,1,mR,0) ,(mL,0,mR,0) ,(mL,1,mR,1)}
L otherwise.
Note that of all the strategies that satisfy the three properties, strategies σL and σR are the simplest
in terms of the number of “bits” needed to implement the message function. Strategy σC is in a
certain sense the fairest: conditional on a coordination conflict, i.e., conditional on one agent having
a type between 0 and 1/2 and the other agent having a type between 1/2 and 1, both agents expect the
same payoff. By contrast, strategy σL favors types below 1/2, and strategy σR favors types above 1/2.
Examples of equilibria not satisfying some of the properties The coordination game with com-
munication 〈Γ,M〉 admits many more equilibria that satisfy only some or even none of the three
properties defined above. It has, for instance, two simple babbling equilibria, in which agents ig-
nore the communication and apply a uniform norm of always playing L (or R). These equilibria are
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coordinated and trivially have binary communication, but are not mutual-preference consistent.
Depending on the distribution of types, the game can also have additional inefficient babbling
equilibria, in which agents sometimes miscoordinate. Specifically, if there exists a type x∈ (0,1) sat-
isfying x= F (x), then there is a babbling equilibrium in which agents ignore messages and choose L
if and only if their type is below x. Such a babbling equilibrium (trivially) has binary communication
but does not satisfy the other two properties defined above. Note that, as by assumption F(0) = 0
and F(1) = 1, all babbling equilibria can be identified with an x ∈ [0,1] that satisfies F(x) = x.
Remark 4 (Robustness of equilibria without communication). When there is no pre-play communi-
cation (i.e., |M| = 1), then these babbling equilibria of course constitute all equilibria. Arguably, a
plausible equilibrium refinement in setups without communication is robustness to small perturba-
tions in the behavior of the population (e.g., requiring Lyapunov stability of the best-reply dynamics,
or continuous stability à la Eshel, 1983). Adapting the analysis of Sandholm (2007) to the current
setup implies that an equilibrium is robust in this sense if and only if the density of the distribution
of types at the relevant threshold x (with x = F(x)) is less than one. In particular, if the distribu-
tion of types satisfies f (0) , f (1)> 1, then there exists x ∈ (0,1) satisfying x= F (x) and f (x) < 1.
The corresponding equilibrium, which entails inefficient miscoordination, is then robust to small
perturbations. Thus, coordination games without communication are likely to induce substantial
miscoordination if the density of extreme types is high (i.e., if f (0) , f (1)> 1).
The game also admits equilibria in which agents reveal some information about the cardinality of
their preferences (i.e., some information beyond only stating whether u≤ 1/2 or u> 1/2). One simple
example of such an equilibrium for a specific distribution F is Example 1 in Section 6. It is not
completely straightforward to construct such examples for all possible distributions F if we consider
only a single round of communication as we do in the main body of this paper. In Section 8, however,
we show that our main results continue to hold if we allow multiple rounds of communication. In
the case of multiple rounds of communication it is relatively straightforward to construct examples
of equilibria that do not have binary communication and that, therefore, reveal some cardinal content
of the players’ preferences. For simplicity, assume that the distribution F is symmetric around 1/2.
That is f (x) = f (1− x) for all x ∈ [0,1] or, equivalently, F(x) = 1−F(1− x) for all x ∈ [0,1]. In
particular, we have that F(1/2) = 1/2.
The equilibrium is such that there is an x satisfying 0 < x < 1/2 such that in the first round of
communication players indicate whether their preferences are “extreme” (i.e., u ≤ x or u > 1− x)
or “moderately left” (x < u ≤ 1/2) or “moderately right” (1/2 < u ≤ 1− x). In the second round
individuals only reveal real additional information if in the first round one sent the extreme message
and the other a moderate message, in which case the extreme type now reveals which side she
prefers (u ≤ 1/2 or u > 1/2). In this case, joint play is dictated by the extreme type’s preferences.
If both players sent the extreme message in the first round, then there is no more communication
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and both extreme types follow their inclination (play L if u ≤ 1/2 and R otherwise). This leads to
miscoordination with a conditional probability of a half.
Any two moderate types essentially play the coordinated strategy σC; that is if they have the same
preferred outcome, then they play it, and, otherwise, they use communication to induce a joint fair
lottery over both playing L and both playing R. In Appendix C we write this strategy down formally
and show that for any symmetric distribution F there is an x∈ (0, 1/2) such that this strategy is indeed
a Nash equilibrium of the coordination game with two rounds of communication.
4 Definition of Renegotiation-Proofness
For any given strategy in Σ employed by both players in the game 〈Γ,M〉, communication and knowl-
edge of this strategy lead to updated and possibly, different and asymmetric information about the
two agents’ types. Suppose that the updated distributions of types are given by some distribution
functions G and H. The two agents then face a (possibly asymmetric) game of coordination without
communication, which we shall denote by Γ(G,H). Note that the original game (without communi-
cation) Γ is then given by Γ(F,F).
Let fm be the type density conditional on the agent following a given strategy in the game 〈Γ,M〉
and sending a message7 m ∈ supp(µ¯), i.e.,
fm(u) =
f (u)µu(m)
µ¯(m)
,
and let Fm be the cumulative distribution function associated with density fm.
We allow players to renegotiate after communication. Renegotiating players can use any new
finite message set, M˜.8 Given a strategy of the game 〈Γ,M〉 employed by both players, we denote the
induced renegotiation game after a positive probability message pair m,m′ ∈M by 〈Γ(Fm,Fm′),M˜〉.
For a pair of strategies σ ,σ ′ in renegotiation game 〈Γ(G,H),M˜〉, define the post-communication
expected payoffs for a type u agent by
piHu
(
σ ,σ ′
)
= IEv∼H
[
piu,v
(
σ ,σ ′
)]
≡
∫ 1
v=0
piu,v
(
σ ,σ ′
)
h(v)dv.
Define E (G,H) as the set of all (possibly asymmetric) equilibrium profiles of the coordination
game with communication 〈Γ(G,H),M˜〉 for some finite message set M˜. Furthermore, let S (G)
denote the set of all symmetric equilibrium strategies of the coordination game with communication
7The density fm depends on the given strategy in the game 〈Γ,M〉. For aesthetic reasons we refrain from giving this
strategy a name and from indicating this obvious dependence in our notation.
8All of our main results remain the same if one limits renegotiating players to using the original set of messages M,
as long as the set M includes at least four messages (i.e., |M| ≥ 4).
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〈Γ(G,G),M˜〉 for some finite message set M˜. With a slight abuse of notation for any strategy σ of
the game 〈Γ,M〉, we denote by σ its babbling prescription after message pair m,m′ ∈ M, i.e., in
the game 〈Γ(Fm,Fm′),M˜〉 by σ ; that is, we denote by σ the strategy in 〈Γ(Fm,Fm′),M˜〉 in which the
player chooses her message uniformly regardless of her type, and then plays according to what the
original strategy σ induced her to play in 〈Γ,M〉 after observing the message profile (m,m′).
The motivation for renegotiation-proofness is this: If there is an observed pair of messages after
which the original equilibrium induces the agents to play a low payoff strategy profile payoff, then,
arguably, the agents can use an additional round of communication to renegotiate the existing “bad”
equilibrium of the current induced game, and to coordinate their play on a Pareto-improving equi-
librium (which weakly improves the payoff of all possible types of both players). Our refinement of
renegotiation-proofness requires that no such Pareto-improving equilibria exist in any induced game
with additional communication. Formally,
Definition 1. We say that an equilibrium strategy σ ∈ E is post-communication equilibrium Pareto-
dominated if either there is a message m ∈ supp(µ¯) and an equilibrium σ˜ ∈ S (Fm) such that
piFmu (σ ,σ)≤ pi
Fm
u (σ˜ , σ˜) for all u∈ supp(Fm)with strict inequality for some u∈ supp(Fm), or there is a
pair of messagesm 6=m′ ∈ supp(µ¯) and an equilibrium profile σ˜ ∈ E (Fm,Fm′) such that pi
Fm′
u (σ ,σ)≤
pi
Fm′
u (σ˜) and piFmv (σ ,σ) ≤ pi
Fm
v (σ˜) for all u ∈ supp(Fm) and all v ∈ supp(Fm′) with strict inequality
for some u ∈ supp(Fm) or some v ∈ supp(Fm′).
Definition 2. An equilibrium strategy σ ∈ E is renegotiation-proof if it is not post-communication
equilibrium Pareto-dominated.
We have chosen to define a mild notion of renegotiation-proofness because it already suffices for
the strict characterization given in Theorem 1. Our refinement is mild in the following ways: we
allow players to renegotiate only after they observe their realized messages, and when players play
a symmetric induced game, we allow them only to implement an alternative symmetric equilibrium.
All of our results remain the same with a stronger refinement that allows players to: renegotiate
also before communicating (see Remark 6), and play asymmetric equilibria when renegotiating in
symmetric induced games.
5 Main Result
With all this in place we can state our main result.
Theorem 1. A strategy of the game with communication 〈Γ,M〉 is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium
strategy if and only if it is mutual-preference consistent, coordinated, and has binary communication.
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Sketch of proof. The “if” part, i.e., that any strategy satisfying the three key properties must be
renegotiation-proof, is fairly straightforward. We here provide a sketch of the proof of the “only
if” part. The proof in Appendix A.2 is split into three lemmas, each showing that one of the three
properties must hold.
Lemma 2 proves that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategymust be coordinated: if play after
any message pair is not coordinated then it is Pareto inferior (given the information about players’
types implicit in this message pair) to either σL, σR, or σC. To see this, suppose first that both
players use thresholds below 1/2. Then this strategy is Pareto-dominated by σR as types above 1/2
gain because σR induces their first-best outcome, and types below 1/2 gain because σR yields a higher
coordination probability and a higher probability of the opponent playing this type’s preferred action
L. Analogously, an equilibrium in which both players use thresholds above 1/2 is Pareto-dominated
by σL. Suppose, finally, that player one uses threshold x < 1/2, while player two uses threshold
x′ > 1/2. Observe that x < 1/2 (resp., x′ > 1/2) can be an equilibrium threshold only if player two
(resp., player one) plays L with an average probability of less (resp., more) than 1/2. This, implies
that players in these equilibria coordinate with a probability of at most 1/2, and one can show that
such a low coordination probability implies that these equilibria are Pareto-dominated by σC.
Next, we show in Lemma 3 that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy must have binary
communication. The reason for this is that if a strategy is coordinated, then different messages can
only lead to different ex-ante probabilities of coordination on L (and R). Thus, any type who favors
L, i.e., any type u< 1/2, will choose a message to maximize this probability, while any type u> 1/2
will choose a message to minimize this probability. Thus, essentially only two kinds of messages
are used in a coordinated equilibrium strategy.
Finally, we show in Lemma 4 that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy must be mutual-
preference consistent. Given that it is coordinated, we know that any message pair will lead to either
coordination on L or on R. If it is not mutual-preference consistent then, without loss of generality,
there are two types u,u′ < 1/2 that, with positive probability, send a message pair (m,m′) that leads
them to coordinate on R. But then all types who send this message pair would be weakly better off
(and some strictly better off) if instead of coordinating on R they use strategy σR, which would allow
them to coordinate on L if and only if both types are below9 1/2.
Remark 5. Note that the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria is completely independent of the distri-
bution of private preferences. This implies that any renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy remains
9In our proof we actually prove a slightly stronger result. Any equilibrium that is not renegotiation-proof is in fact
such that the equilibrium strategy is Pareto-dominated by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy after some (positive
probability) message pair, while no renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy is Pareto-dominated by any equilibrium
strategy after any message pair. See the related discussion of internal and external consistency requirements for a
definition of renegotiation-proof strategies in repeated games in, e.g., Ray (1994).
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renegotiation-proof even in setups in which the distributions of types of the two players are corre-
lated, and in setups in which different types have different beliefs about the opponent’s type.
6 On Efficiency
In this section we investigate the efficiency properties of renegotiation-proof equilibria. We first
argue that the first-best outcome cannot be achieved by any equilibrium of any coordination game
with communication. We then provide an example of an equilibrium with high ex-ante payoffs that
is not, however, renegotiation-proof. We then show that all renegotiation-proof equilibria, while
not necessarily ex-ante payoff optimal, are at least interim (pre-communication) Pareto efficient.
Finally, we show that at least one of the two “extreme” renegotiation-proof equilibria, σL and σR,
provides the highest ex-ante payoff of all the coordinated equilibria, and that any equilibriumwithout
communication is Pareto-dominated by either one of these extreme renegotiation-proof equilibria or
by the action-symmetric renegotiation-proof equilibrium σC.
First best The first-best ex-ante payoff can be induced only by a strategy that is coordinated and
such that the coordinated outcome depends heavily on the cardinal preferences of the two agents.
Specifically, the first-best strategy is one that induces coordination on L whenever u+ v ≤ 1 and
coordination on R otherwise. The first-best ex-ante payoff can thus be induced only by a strategy in
which each agent reveals her type, and the two agents then choose the favorite outcome, L or R, of
the more extreme type (i.e., the type that is farther away from 1/2). Note that this strategy is not an
equilibrium: each player has an incentive to present a more extreme type than her real type (e.g., all
types u> 1/2 would claim to have type 1).
High payoff of non-coordinated equilibria Equilibria with miscoordination (which cannot be
renegotiation-proof due to Theorem 1) may induce agents to credibly reveal some cardinal infor-
mation about their type. This can happen if there is a message that induces a higher probability
of coordinating on the agent’s preferred outcome but also a higher probability of miscoordination
compared with some other available message. Such a message can then be chosen by extreme types
with u far from 1/2, while moderate types with u closer to 1/2 choose the other message. Such equi-
libria with miscoordination may induce a higher ex-ante payoff, if the benefit from signaling the
extremeness of the type outweighs the loss due to miscoordination. Consider the following example.
Example 1. For simplicity we let the distribution of types F be discrete with four atoms 1/10+ ε ,
1/2− ε , 1/2+ ε , 9/10− ε , with a probability of 1/4 for each atom and ε > 0 sufficiently small.10 The
10One can easily adapt the example to an atomless distribution of types, in which each atom is replaced with a
continuum of nearby types.
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game admits three babbling equilibria: always coordinating on L, always coordinating on R, both
with an ex-ante payoff of 1/2, and playing L if and only if the type is less than 1/2 with an ex-ante
payoff of 7/20 < 1/2 for all ε sufficiently small. Theorem 1 (together with the symmetry of the
distribution F) implies that with communication, any renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy (in
particular σL or σR) induces the same expected ex-ante payoff of 3/5> 1/2 for all ε sufficiently small.
This game also has a (non-renegotiation-proof) equilibrium strategy with miscoordination that
yields a higher ex-ante payoff than the renegotiation-proof payoff of 3/5, provided that the message
set M has sufficiently many elements. To simplify the presentation we here allow the players to
use public correlation devices to determine their joint play after sending messages, which can be
approximately implemented by a sufficiently large message set (à la Aumann and Maschler, 1968;
see the similar construction in Case (II) of the proof of Proposition 8 in Appendix E.7.3). Let
mL,ml,mr,mR ∈M and consider strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) as follows. Let µ(1/10+ ε) = mL, µ(1/2− ε) =
ml , µ(1/2+ ε) = mr, and µ(9/10− ε) = mR, and let ξ (ma,mb) = L if a,b ∈ {L, l}, ξ (ma,mb) = R
if a,b ∈ {r,R}, ξ (mL,mr) = L, ξ (ml,mR) = R, ξ (ml,mr) be a joint lottery to coordinate on L or
R with probability 1/2 each, and, finally, let ξ (mL,mR) be a joint lottery to coordinate on L or R
with probability 3/10 each, and to play the inefficient mixed equilibrium (in which each type plays
her preferred outcome with probability 9/10− ε) with probability 4/10. It is straightforward to verify
that for, say ε = 1/100, this strategy is indeed an equilibrium strategy with an ex-ante payoff of
around 0.627, which is higher than the ex-ante payoff of 3/5 of all the renegotiation-proof equilibria.
This equilibrium strategy is not coordinated (nor does it satisfy the other two properties of mutual-
preference consistency and binary communication) and hence, by Theorem 1, it is not renegotiation-
proof.
Interim (pre-communication) Pareto optimality An (ex-ante symmetric) social choice function
is a function φ : [0,1]2 → ∆
(
{L,R}2
)
assigning to each pair of types a possibly correlated action
profile with the condition that φu,v(a,b) = φv,u(b,a) for any a,b ∈ {L,R}, where11 φu,v ≡ φ (u,v).
We interpret φu,v as the correlated action profile played by the two players when a player of type u
interacts with a player of type v. Let Φ be the set of all such functions.
Any strategy of any coordination game with communication (with any finite message set) induces
a social choice function in Φ, but not all social choice functions in Φ can be generated by a strategy
of a given coordination game with communication. One can interpret Φ as the set of outcomes that
can be implemented by a social planner who perfectly observes the types of both players and, can
force the players to play arbitrarily.
11We restrict attention to symmetric social choice functions here for two reasons. First, it makes the paper conceptually
consistent, given that the subject of the paper, coordination games with communication, is a class of (ex-ante) symmetric
games. Second, it makes it unnecessary for us to here introduce player subscripts that we do not need anywhere else in
the paper. Proposition 1 below, however, also holds even if we allow asymmetric social choice functions.
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For each type u ∈ [0,1], let piu (φ) denote the expected payoff of a player of type u under social
choice function φ , i.e.,
piu (φ) = IEv [(1−u)φu,v (L,L)+uφu,v (R,R)] .
A strategy is interim (pre-communication) Pareto-dominated if there is a social choice function that
is weakly better for all types, and strictly better for some types.
Definition 3. A strategy σ ∈ Σ is interim (pre-communication) Pareto-dominated by a social choice
function φ ∈ Φ if piu (σ ,σ) ≤ piu (φ) for each type u ∈ [0,1], with the inequality being strict for a
positive measure set of types. A strategy σ ∈ Σ is interim (pre-communication) Pareto optimal if it
is not interim (pre-communication) Pareto-dominated by any φ ∈Φ.
Proposition 1. Every renegotiation-proof strategy of a coordination game with communication is
interim (pre-communication) Pareto optimal.
Sketch of proof; see Appendix A.3 for the formal proof. Recall that by Theorem 1 and Remark 3,
any renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ is characterized by its left tendency ασ . In order
for a social choice function φ to improve the payoff of any type u < 1/2 (resp., u > 1/2) relative to
the payoff induced by σ , it must be that φ induces any type u< 1/2 (resp., u> 1/2) to coordinate on
L with probability larger (resp., smaller) than ασ . This, in turn, implies that the probability of two
players coordinating on L, conditional on the players having different preferred outcomes, must be
larger (resp., smaller) than ασ . However, these two requirements contradict each other.
Earlier in this section we have given an example of an equilibrium strategy that provides a higher
ex-ante payoff than any renegotiation-proof equilibrium. This strategy involved a certain degree of
miscoordination. In the following proposition we show that any equilibrium without miscoordina-
tion, i.e., any coordinated equilibrium, must provide an ex-ante expected payoff that is less than or
equal to the maximal ex-ante payoff of the two “extreme” renegotiation-proof strategies σL and σR.
Proposition 2. Let σ ∈ E be a coordinated equilibrium strategy. Then
pi (σ ,σ)≤max{pi (σL,σL) ,pi (σR,σR)} .
Sketch of proof; see Appendix A.3 for the formal proof. Let ασ be the probability of two players who
each follow σ to coordinate on L, conditional on the players having different preferred outcomes. It
is easy to see that σ is dominated by the renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy with the same left
tendency ασ , and that the payoff of the latter strategy is a convex combination of the payoffs of σL
and σR, which implies that pi (σ ,σ)≤max{pi (σL,σL) ,pi (σR,σR)}.
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Remark 6. [All-stage renegotiation-proofness à la Benoit and Krishna, 1993] One could refine the
notion of renegotiation-proofness to allow agents to renegotiate to a Pareto-improving equilibrium
also in earlier stages: in the interim stage before observing the realized messages induced by the
original equilibrium, and in the ex-ante stage before each agent observes her own type. This more
restrictive definition of renegotiation-proofness à la Benoit and Krishna (1993) enables us to view a
strategy satisfying our definition of renegotiation-proofness as ex-post renegotiation-proof strategy;
or as interim renegotiation-proof strategy if, in addition, it is not Pareto-dominated (in the original
game after each agent observes her own type, yet before observing the realized message profile)
by any ex-post renegotiation-proof strategy; or as all-stage renegotiation-proof strategy if there is
no other interim renegotiation-proof strategy that induces a higher ex-ante expected payoff to both
players (before each player knows her own type). Clearly, any ex-post renegotiation-proof strat-
egy that satisfies interim Pareto optimality is an interim renegotiation-proof strategy. Proposition 2
implies that either σL or σR provides the maximal ex-ante payoff of all the interim renegotiation-
proof strategies, and hence either σL or σR is an all-stage renegotiation-proof strategy. Moreover, if
pi (σR,σR) 6= pi (σL,σL), then one can show that either σL or σR is the unique coordinated strategy
that maximizes the ex-ante payoff, and, thus, the unique all-stage renegotiation-proof strategy.
Next, we show that σL or σR provides a strictly higher ex-ante expected payoff than any equi-
librium of the game without communication (and therefore than any babbling equilibrium of the
game with communication). Recall from Remark 4 and the text preceding it that in the coordination
game without communication any equilibrium is characterized by a cutoff value x ∈ [0,1] such that
x= F(x) with the interpretation that types u≤ x play L and types u> x play R.
Let piu (x,x′) denote the payoff of an agent with type u who follows a strategy with cutoff x and
faces a partner of unknown type who follows a strategy with cutoff x′, which is given by
piu
(
x,x′
)
= 1{u≤x}F
(
x′
)
(1−u)+1{u>x}
(
1−F
(
x′
))
u,
and let pi (x,x′) = IEu [piu (x,x′)] be the ex-ante expected payoff of an agent who follows strategy x and
faces a partner who follows x′. Our final result shows that any (possibly asymmetric) equilibrium in
the game without communication is Pareto-dominated by either σL, σR, or σC.
Corollary 1. Let (x,x′) be a (possibly asymmetric) equilibrium in the coordination game without
communication. Then piu (x,x
′) ≤ piu (σL,σL) for all types u ∈U, or piu (x,x
′) ≤ piu (σR,σR) for all
types u ∈U, or piu (x,x
′) ≤ piu (σC,σC) for all types u ∈U. Moreover, all the inequalities are strict
for almost all types.
Corollary 1 is immediately implied by Lemma 2 in Appendix A.2, and the sketch of proof of the
lemma is presented as part of the sketch of the proof of Theorem 1.
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7 Evolutionary Stability
A common interpretation of a Nash equilibrium is a convention that is reached as a result of a pro-
cess of social learning when similar games are repeatedly played within a large population. This
interpretation seems very apt, for instance, if we think of our motivating example of how pedestrians
avoid bumping into each other. Specifically, consider a population in which a pair of agents from a
large population are occasionally randomly matched and play the coordination game with commu-
nication 〈Γ,M〉. The agents can observe past behavior of other agents who played similar games in
the past. It seems plausible that the aggregate behavior of the population would gradually converge
into a self-enforcing convention, which is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of 〈Γ,M〉 (see the “mass
action” by Nash (1950); and see Weibull (1995) and Sandholm (2010) for a textbook introduction).
We have argued that renegotiation-proofness is a necessary condition of evolutionary stability
by capturing the idea of stability with respect to secret-handshake mutations as in Robson (1990).
In this section we report results from Appendix D in which we investigate the evolutionary stability
properties of both σL and σR (the results can be extended to all renegotiation-proof strategies).
In Appendix D.1 we show that strategies σL and σR are neutrally stable strategies (NSS) in the
sense of Maynard Smith and Price (1973), and evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) if |M|= 2. This
implies that σL and σR are robust to the presence of a small proportion of experimenting agents who
behave differently than the rest of the population.
We are not quite satisfied with this result for three reasons. First, neutral stability is not the
strongest form of evolutionary stability, although in games with cheap talk it is typically the strongest
form of stability one can expect owing to the freedom that unused messages provide mutants; see,
e.g., Banerjee and Weibull (2000).12 Second, our game, owing to the incomplete information mod-
eled here as a continuum variable, has a continuum of strategies, especially in the action phase after
messages are observed. But with a continuum of strategies the notion of even an ESS is not suffi-
cient to imply local convergence to the equilibrium from nearby states. The reason for this, see e.g.,
Oechssler and Riedel (2002), is that ESS for continuum models considers only the possibly large
strategy deviation of a small proportion of individuals and not the small strategy deviation of possi-
bly a large proportion of individuals. Lastly, our cheap-talk game is a two-stage game and, hence,
an extensive-form game. It is well known that extensive-form games do not admit ESSs of the entire
game (unless they are strict equilibria; see Selten, 1980), and hence it seems reasonable to explore
the stability of equilibrium behavior in each stage separately.
To address these issues we investigate two additional evolutionary stability properties. We inves-
12We here do not consider set-valued concepts of evolutionarily stability such as evolutionary stable sets (Swinkels,
1992 and the related analysis in, e.g., Balkenborg and Schlag, 2001, 2007), nor the perturbation-based concept of limit-
ESS (Selten, 1983; Heller, 2014), which lies in between ESS and NSS.
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tigate the evolutionary stability in each induced game that is on the equilibrium path.13 Evolution
will not necessarily place huge restrictions on play in unreached induced games (see, e.g., Nachbar,
1990; Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson, 1995), but should do so for induced games reached with pos-
itive probability. To address this, we study the evolutionary stability properties of strategies σL and
σR at the message level (taking as given the action functions in the second stage), and at the action
level (after messages that are observed with positive probability). In Appendix D.2 we show that,
when the action is fixed to be either ξL or ξR, the message function µ∗ used by σL and σR is weakly
dominant. This is a substantially stronger property than the message function being an NSS.14
In Appendix D.3 we investigate the evolutionary stability properties of the action choice induced
by σL and σR after the players observe the message pair. As choosing an action as a function of a
player’s type is equivalent to choosing a cutoff from a continuum (the unit interval), we employ a
stability concept designed for such cases. The issue is further complicated by the fact that, owing
to the asymmetry after unequal messages, we need to employ a multidimensional stability con-
cept. The literature provides one in the form of a neighborhood invader strategy developed for the
double-population case by Cressman (2010), building on earlier work by Eshel and Motro (1981)
and Apaloo (1997), among others. We show that the action choice induced by σL and σR indeed
constitutes a neighborhood invader strategy after each pair of possible messages.
8 Extensions
In this section we present informally various extensions and robustness checks of our main results.
We postpone the detailed formal analysis to Appendix E.
Long communication In Appendix E.1 we show that all of our results hold in a setup in which
the pre-play communication phase includes multiple rounds. Players observe messages after each
round and can condition their message choice and their final action choice on the history of observed
message pairs. Renegotiation takes place once, just before the final action choices are made.
Multidimensional sets of types In Appendix E.2 we study general symmetric two-action two-
player coordination games, where miscoordination may result in different payoffs to the L and R
13Our renegotiation-proofness concept does not impose any restrictions on unreached induced games other than that
the strategy in the whole game must be an equilibrium strategy: we do not require play in unreached induced games to
be a Nash equilibrium nor do we require renegotiation-proofness in unreached induced games. Therefore, we here do
not demand evolutionary stability in unreached induced games.
14For dynamic evolutionary processes weakly dominated strategies are not always eliminated. See, e.g., Weibull
(1995), Hart (2002), Kuzmics (2004), Kuzmics (2011), Laraki and Mertikopoulos (2013), Bernergård and Mohlin
(2019) for a discussion of this issue. Note also that Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) made it a desideratum that a con-
cept of strategic stability should not include weakly dominated strategies.
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players. The “if” direction of Theorem 1 still holds in this general setup: any strategy that satisfies
the three key properties is renegotiation-proof. Theorem 2 shows that the “only if” direction holds as
well. Specifically, it holds under the restriction of “unambiguous coordination preferences,” which
requires that for all feasible types the preferred coordinated action also be the risk-dominant action
(i.e., the best reply against an opponent who plays each action uniformly; see Harsanyi and Selten,
1988). Example 2 in Appendix E.2 suggests that without this restriction (i.e., with stag-hunt-like
types for which the payoff-dominant action does not coincide with the risk-dominant action), equi-
libria with miscoordination may be renegotiation-proof.
More than two players Suppose that there are n≥ 2 players. The payoff of each player of type u
is equal to u if all players play R, it is equal to 1−u if all players play L, and it is equal to zero if not
all the players play the same action. In Appendix E.3 we show that our main result (Theorem 1) as
well as appropriate versions of the efficiency results hold in this setup.
Asymmetric coordination games Appendix E.4 shows that all our results hold in asymmetric
coordination games in which the distributions of the types of the two players’ positions may differ.
Coordination games with more than 2 actions In Appendix E.5 we analyze coordination games
with more than two actions. In this setup we are able to prove somewhat weaker variants of our
main result. First, we show that σC remains a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy in this more
general setup (by contrast, strategies σL and σR might not be equilibria in this setup). While we do
not have a full characterization of the set of renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategies, we are able
to show that renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategies must satisfy mutual-preference consistency
and coordination whenever both players have sent the same message.
Extreme types with dominant actions Appendix E.6 extends our analysis to a setup in which
some types find that one of the actions is a dominant action for them. We show that in the presence
of these extreme types there exists an essentially unique renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy
that satisfies the three key properties, where the left tendency of this strategy is equal to the share of
extreme types whose dominant action is L. In this setup moderate “leftists,” i.e., types u ∈ (0, 1/2),
gain if there are more extreme “leftists” than extreme “rightists,” in the sense that the above essen-
tially unique renegotiation-proof strategy induces a higher probability of coordination on action L
when two agents with different preferred outcomes meet.
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9 Discussion
Renegotiation-proofness concepts have been developed in the context of infinitely and finitely re-
peated games with complete information in, e.g., Farrell and Maskin (1989), Van Damme (1989),
Bernheim and Ray (1989), Evans and Maskin (1989), and in, e.g., Benoit and Krishna (1993) and
Wen (1996), respectively. There is a sizable literature on the renegotiation-proofness of contracts
in the presence of asymmetric information going back to Hart and Tirole (1988) and Dewatripont
(1989) and including recent contributions by Maestri (2017) and Strulovici (2017).
A close concept to our notion of renegotiation proofness is that of posterior efficiency of Forges
(1994) (building on Holmström and Myerson, 1983). Forges (1994) argues that the final outcome
of a mechanism (or here strategy profile) will not necessarily fully reveal all initially privately held
information. Posterior efficiency then only demands that the outcome be efficient given the informa-
tion that the people can infer from the outcome of the mechanism alone. Similarly we here demand
that the strategy profile prescribe an action profile after messages are sent that is efficient given the
information revealed by the messages sent. Thus, our players have more information than just the
prescribed action profile as they in fact observe also the messages that typically provide additional
information; see also Kawakami (2016, page 897). Our definition of renegotiation-proofness nec-
essarily also differs from Forges’s posterior efficiency in that in our strategic setting we impose the
additional (sequential rationality) requirement that agents play an equilibrium action profile given
the information they have.
Starting with the secret handshake argument provided in Robson (1990) (see also the earlier
related notion of “green beard effect” in Hamilton, 1964; Dawkins, 1976), there is a sizable literature
on the evolutionary analysis of costless pre-play communication before players engage in a complete
information coordination game. This includes, e.g., Sobel (1993), Blume, Kim, and Sobel (1993),
Wärneryd (1993), Kim and Sobel (1995), Bhaskar (1998), and Hurkens and Schlag (2003).15
Suppose that a complete information coordination game has two Pareto-rankable equilibria.
Then the Pareto-inferior equilibrium is not evolutionarily stable as it can be invaded by mutants
who use a previously unused message as a secret handshake: if their opponent does not use the
same handshake they simply play the Pareto-inferior equilibrium (as do all incumbents), but if their
opponent also uses the secret handshake both sides play the Pareto-superior equilibrium.
Suppose that the game has an equilibrium that is not Pareto-dominated by another equilibrium
but is Pareto-dominated by some non-equilibrium strategy profile. Then the same argument would
suggest that not only the Pareto-dominated equilibrium is unstable, but also the mutant strategy pro-
file – by virtue of not being an equilibrium – is itself unstable. To sidestep this issue, one can appeal
15 In the same spirit, but using different equilibrium refinements, is the literature that models repeated pre-play com-
munication as structured negotiation that influences which equilibrium to play in a complete-information game (see, e.g.,
Farrell and Maskin, 1989; Rabin, 1994; and Safronov and Strulovici, 2019).
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to the notion of “robustness to equilibrium entrants” introduced by Swinkels (1992), that considers
only those mutants that play an equilibrium strategy. In the prisoner’s dilemma, for example, mutual
defection is the unique strategy profile that is robust with respect to equilibrium entrants. Our notion
of renegotiation-proofness has a similar flavor as we require that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium
not to be dominated by another equilibrium. Given the incomplete information in our model we
believe that the most appropriate place to apply this idea is at the stage after messages are sent, i.e.,
at the posterior stage in the language of Forges (1994), as explained above.16
Another related literature deals with stable equilibria in coordination games with private values,
but without pre-play communication. Sandholm (2007) (extending earlier results of Fudenberg and Kreps,
1993; Ellison and Fudenberg, 2000) shows that mixed Nash equilibria of the game with complete in-
formation can be purified in the sense of Harsanyi (1973) in an evolutionarily stable way (see also Re-
mark 4). 17 Finally, two related papers analyze stag-hunt games with private values. Baliga and Sjöström
(2004) show that introducing pre-play communication induces a new equilibrium in which the
Pareto-dominant action profile is played with high probability. Jelnov, Tauman, and Zhao (2018)
show that in some cases a small probability of another interaction can substantially affect the set of
equilibrium outcomes in stag-hunt games with private values.
A Proofs of Main Results
A.1 Undominated Action Strategies
In this subsection we show that our restriction to threshold action functions is without loss of gener-
ality, in the sense that each generalized action function is dominated by a threshold strategy.
Let Γ(F,G) be a coordination game without communication (possibly played after a pair of mes-
sages is observed in the original game 〈Γ,M〉). A generalized strategy in this game is a measurable
function η :U → ∆({L,R}) that describes a mixed action as a function of the player’s type. A gen-
eralized strategy in Γ(F,G) corresponds to a generalized action function ξ :U×M×M→△{L,R}
(see Remark 2), given a specific pair of observed messages (m,m′), i.e., η (u)≡ ξ (u,m,m′).
A pair of generalized strategies η, η˜ are almost surely realization equivalent (abbr., equivalent),
which we denote by η ≈ η˜ , if they induce the same behavior with probability one, i.e., if
IEu∼F [η (u) 6= η˜ (u)]≡
∫
u∈U
f (u)1{η(u) 6=η˜(u)}du= 0.
16In a recent paper, Newton (2017) provides an evolutionary foundation for players developing the ability to renego-
tiate into a Pareto-better outcome (“collaboration” in the terminology of Newton).
17See also Neary and Newton (2017) who study coordination games without communication played on a graph, and
provide sufficient conditions for heterogeneous equilibria with miscoordination to be stable.
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It is immediate that two equivalent generalized strategies always induce the same (ex-ante) payoff,
i.e., that pi (η,η ′) = pi (η˜,η ′) for each generalized strategy η ′.
A generalized strategy is a cutoff strategy if there exists a type x ∈ [0,1] such that η(u) = L
for each u < x and η(u) = R for each u > x. A generalized strategy η is strictly dominated by
generalized strategy η˜ if pi (η,η ′)< pi (η˜,η ′) for any generalized strategy η ′ of the opponent.
The following result shows that any generalized strategy is either equivalent to a cutoff strategy,
or it is strictly dominated by a cutoff strategy.
Lemma 1. Let η be a generalized strategy. Then there exists a cutoff strategy η˜ , such that either η
is equivalent to η˜ , or η is strictly dominated by η˜ .
Proof. If IEu∼F [ηu(L)] = 1 (resp., IEu∼F [ηu(L)] = 0), then η is equivalent to the cutoff strategy of
always playing L (resp., R). Thus, suppose that IEu∼F [ηu(L)] ∈ (0,1). Let x ∈ (0,1) be such that
F(x) = IEu∼F [ηu(L)] =
∫
u ηu(L) f (u)du. Let η˜ then be the cutoff strategy with cutoff x, i.e.,
η˜u(L) =

1 u≤ x0 u> x.
Assume that η and η˜ are not equivalent, i.e., η 6≈ η˜ . Let η ′ be an arbitrary generalized strategy of
the opponent. By construction, strategies η and η˜ induce the same average probability of choosing L.
Strategies η˜ and η differ in that η˜ induces lower types to choose Lwith higher probability, and higher
types to choose L with lower probability, i.e., ηu(L) ≤ η˜u(L) for any type u≤ x and ηu(L) ≥ η˜u(L)
for any type u> x. Since η 6≈ η˜ and IEu∼F [ηu(L)] ∈ (0,1), it follows that the inequalities are strict
for a positive measure of types, i.e.,
0<
∫
u<x
f (u)1{η(u)<η˜(u)}du and 0<
∫
u>x
f (u)1{η(u)>η˜(u)}du.
The fact that lower types always gain more (less) from choosing L (R) relative to higher types,
with a strict inequality unless the opponent always plays R (L), implies that pi (η,η ′)< pi (η˜,η ′).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove the “if” part of the theorem. Suppose that σ = (µ,ξ ) ∈ Σ is mutual-preference
consistent, coordinated, and has binary communication.
As σ is mutual-preference consistent it must satisfy supp(Fm) ⊆ [0, 1/2] or supp(Fm) ⊆ [1/2,1]
for any message m ∈ supp(µ¯). Consider any message pair m,m′ ∈ supp(µ¯). There are three cases
to consider. Suppose first that both supp(Fm),supp(Fm′) ⊆ [0, 1/2]. Then as σ is mutual-preference
consistent we have that ξ (m,m′) = ξ (m′,m) = L. Thus ξ describes best-reply behavior after this
message pair. Moreover this behavior is the best possible outcome for any type in [0, 1/2] and thus for
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any type in supp(Fm) and supp(Fm′). The second case of supp(Fm),supp(Fm′)⊆ [1/2,1] is analogous.
Suppose, finally, that, w.l.o.g., supp(Fm) ⊆ [0, 1/2] and supp(Fm′) ⊆ [1/2,1]. As σ is coordinated we
have that ξ (m,m′) = ξ (m′,m) = L or ξ (m,m′) = ξ (m′,m) = R. Action function ξ , therefore, again
describes best-reply behavior. Moreover, one player always obtains her most preferred outcome. In
order for a new strategy profile to improve the opponent’s outcome, this new profile must require the
former player to deviate from her most preferred outcome. Thus, there is no message set M˜ such that
an equilibrium σ ′ in the game 〈Γ(Fm,Fm′),M˜〉 Pareto dominates σ after this message pair.
All this shows that action function ξ is a best response to µ and to itself given µ and that,
moreover, it cannot be post-communication equilibrium Pareto-dominated. It remains to show that
the message function µ is optimal when the opponent chooses σ = (µ,ξ ).
Consider type u ∈ [0, 1/2] and consider this type’s choice of message. As σ has binary com-
munication and is coordinated, different messages m ∈M can only trigger different probabilities of
coordinating on L with a highest likelihood of such coordination for any message m ∈ supp(µu).
Therefore, type u is indifferent between any message m ∈ supp(µu) and weakly prefers sending any
message m ∈ supp(µu) to sending any message m′ 6∈ supp(µu). An analogous statement holds for
types u ∈ [1/2,1]. This concludes the proof of the “if” part of the theorem.
We prove the “only if” part in three lemmas, one for each of the three properties.
Lemma 2. Every renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) is coordinated.
Proof. We need to show that for any message pair m,m′ ∈ supp(µ¯),
either ξ (m,m′)≥ sup{u | µu(m)> 0} or ξ (m,m′)≤ inf{u | µu(m)> 0} .
Let m,m′ ∈ supp(µ¯) and assume to the contrary that
inf{u | µu(m)> 0}< ξ (m,m′)< sup{u | µu(m)> 0} .
As σ is an equilibrium, we have inf{u | µu(m′)> 0} < ξ (m′,m) < sup{u | µu(m′)> 0} because
otherwise the sender of m′ would play L with probability one or R with probability one, in which
case the the best reply of the sender of message m would be to play L (or R) regardless of her type.
Let x= ξ (m,m′) and x′= ξ (m′,m). We now show that the equilibrium (x,x′) of the game without
coordination Γ(Fm,Fm′) is post-communication Pareto-dominated by either σL, σR, or σC.
There are three cases to be considered. Case 1: Suppose that x,x′ ≤ 1/2. We now show that in this
case the equilibrium (x,x′) is Pareto-dominated by σR. Consider the player who sent message m.
Case 1a: Consider a type u≤ x. Then we have
(1−u)Fm′(
1
2)+u
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
≥ (1−u)Fm′(x′),
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where the left-hand side is type a u agent’s payoff under strategy profile σR and the right-hand side the
payoff under strategy profile (x,x′). The inequality follows from the fact that u(1−Fm′(1/2))≥ 0, and
Fm′(1/2) ≥ Fm′(x
′) follows from the fact that Fm′ is nondecreasing (as it is a cumulative distribution
function). This inequality is strict for all u except for u= 0 in the case where x′ = 1/2.
Case 1b: Now consider a type u with x< u≤ 1/2. Then we have
(1−u)Fm′(
1
2)+u
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
> u(1−Fm′(x′)) ,
where the left-hand side is a type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile σR and the right-hand side
is the payoff under strategy profile (x,x′). The inequality follows from the fact that by u ≤ 1/2 we
have that 1−u≥ u, and therefore (1−u)Fm′(1/2)+u(1−Fm′(1/2))≥ u.
Case 1c: Finally, consider a type u> 1/2. Then we have u> u(1−Fm′(x′)) , where the left-hand
side is a type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile σR and the right-hand side is the payoff under
strategy profile (x,x′).
The analysis for the player who sent message m′ is analogous.
Case 2: Suppose that x,x′ ≥ 1/2. The analysis is analogous to Case 1 if we replace σR with σL.
Case 3: Suppose, w.l.o.g. for the remaining cases, that x ≤ 1/2 ≤ x′. The equilibrium (x,x′) in
this case is Pareto-dominated by σC. To see this, consider the player who sent message m.
Case 3a: Consider a type u≤ x. Then we have
(1−u)
[
Fm′(
1
2)+
1
2
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)]
+u12
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
> (1−u)Fm′(x′),
where the left-hand side is a type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile σC and the right-hand
side the payoff under strategy profile (x,x′). The inequality follows from the fact that we have
Fm′(x
′) = x≤ 1/2 due to (x,x′) being an equilibrium.
Case 3b: Now consider a type u with x< u≤ 1/2. Then we have
(1−u)
[
Fm′(
1
2)+
1
2
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)]
+u12
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
> u(1−Fm′(x′)) ,
where the left-hand side is a type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile σC and the right-hand side
the payoff under strategy profile (x,x′). The inequality follows from the fact that by u≤ 1/2 we have
1−u≥ u and thus (1−u)
[
Fm′(
1
2)+
1
2
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)]
+u12
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
≥ u.
Case 3c: Finally, consider a type u> 1/2. Then we have
u
[(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
+ 12Fm′(
1
2)
]
+(1−u)12Fm′(
1
2)> u(1−Fm′(x
′)) ,
where the left-hand side is a type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile σC and the right-hand side is
the payoff under strategy profile (x,x′). The inequality follows from the fact that we have Fm′(1/2)> 0
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and Fm′(1/2)≤ Fm′(x′).
The analysis for the player who sent message m′ is analogous.
Lemma 3. Every renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ has binary communication.
Proof. Let σ be a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy. Recall that
β σ (m) =
∫ 1
u=0
∑
m′∈M
µu(m
′)1{u≤ξ (m,m′)} f (u)du.
As σ is coordinated by Lemma 2, the payoff to a type u from sending message m ∈ supp(µ) is
(1−u)β σ(m)+u(1−β σ (m)) .
For a type u< 1/2 the problem of choosing a message to maximize her payoffs is thus equivalent
to choosing a message that maximizes β σ (m). We thus must have that there is a β
σ
∈ [0,1] such that
for all u< 1/2 and all m ∈ supp(µu), we have β σ (m) = β
σ
. Analogously, we must have a β σ ∈ [0,1]
such that for all u> 1/2 and allm∈ supp(µu), we haveασ (m)= β
σ
. Clearly also β σ ≤ β
σ
. To extend
the argument to unused messages m 6∈ supp(µ) we rely on the full support assumption. Assume to
the contrary that there is a message m 6∈ supp(µ) with β σ (m) > β
σ
(resp., β σ (m) < β σ ). Then
any sufficiently high (resp., low) type u would strictly earn by deviating to sending message m and
playing L (resp., R), which contradicts the supposition that σ is an equilibrium strategy.
Lemma 4. Every renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ is mutual-preference consistent.
Proof. By Lemma 2 a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) is coordinated. Suppose
that it is not mutual-preference consistent. Then there is either a message pair (m,m′) such that there
are types u,v< 1/2withm∈ supp(µu) andm′ ∈ supp(µv) such that play after (m,m′) is coordinated on
R, or a message pair (m,m′) such that there are types u,v> 1/2 with m∈ supp(µu) and m′ ∈ supp(µv)
such that play after (m,m′) is coordinated on L. In the former (resp., latter) case strategy σ is
post-communication Pareto dominated by strategy σR (resp., σL) in the game 〈Γ(Fm,Fm′),{mL,mR}〉
because strategy σR (resp., σL) does not affect the payoff of all types u ≥ 1/2 (resp., u ≤ 1/2), and it
strictly improves the payoff to all types u< 1/2 (resp., u> 1/2).
A.3 Proofs of Section 6 (On Efficiency)
Proof of Proposition 1. By Theorem 1 and Remark 3 a renegotiation-proof strategy σ ’s equilibrium
payoff is determined by its left tendency α ≡ ασ ∈ [0,1]. This equilibrium payoff is given by
piu(σ ,σ) = (1−u)
[
F(12)+α
(
1−F(12)
)]
+u(1−α)
[
1−F(12)
]
,
26
for each type u ∈ (0, 1/2], and it is given by
piu(σ ,σ) = (1−u)αF(12)+u
[(
1−F(12)
)
+F(12)(1−α)
]
.
for each type u ∈ (1/2,1]. The payoff to a type u from a given social choice function φ is given by
piu (φ) = (1−u) IEvφu,v (L,L)+uIEvφu,v (R,R) .
Now suppose that φ interim (pre-communication) Pareto dominates σ . Then piu(φ) ≥ piu(σ ,σ)
for all u ∈ [0,1] with a strict inequality for a positive measure of u. As piu(σ ,σ) is a convex combi-
nation of two payoffs, this implies that:
IEvφu,v (L,L) ≥ F(12)+α
(
1−F(12)
)
for any u≤ 1/2, and (1)
IEvφu,v (R,R)≥
(
1−F(12)
)
+F(12)(1−α) for any u> 1/2, (2)
with at least one of the inequalities holding strictly for a positive measure of types. We can write
IEvφu,v (L,L) = F(12)IE{v≤1/2}φu,v (L,L)+
(
1−F(12)
)
IE{v>1/2}φu,v (L,L) ,
where, for instance, IE{v>1/2} denotes the expectation conditional on v > 1/2. Substituting this last
equality in Eq. (1) yields the following inequality
F(12)IE{v≤1/2}φu,v (L,L)+
(
1−F(12)
)
IE{v>1/2}φu,v (L,L) ≥ F(
1
2)+α
(
1−F(12)
)
for any u ≤ 1/2. The fact that IE{v≤1/2}φu,v (L,L) ≤ 1 implies that IE{v>1/2}φu,v (L,L) ≥ α for any
u≤ 1/2. An analogous argument (applied to Eq. (2)) implies that IE{v<1/2}φu,v (R,R)≥ 1−α , for any
u> 1/2, with at least one of these inequalities holding strictly for a positive measure of types.
This implies that
IE{u<1/2}IE{v>1/2}φu,v (L,L) ≥ α and IE{u>1/2}IE{v<1/2}φu,v (R,R)≥ 1−α,
with at least one of the two inequalities holding strictly. By the symmetry of φ we have φu,v(R,R) =
φv,u(R,R) and thus
IE{u<1/2}IE{v>1/2}φu,v (L,L)+ IE{u<1/2}IE{v>1/2}φu,v (R,R)> 1,
which contradicts φu,v being a social choice function.
The proof of Proposition 2 uses the following lemma (which is of independent interest).
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Lemma 5. Let σ ∈ E be a coordinated equilibrium strategy. Then there is a renegotiation-proof
strategy σ ′ such that either σ and σ ′ are interim (pre-communication) payoff equivalent or σ ′ in-
terim (pre-communication) Pareto dominates σ .
Proof. Let σ =(µ,ξ )∈ E be coordinated. For each messagem∈M, let pm ∈ [0,1] be the probability
that the players coordinate on L, conditional on the agent sending message m:
pm = ∑
m′∈M
µ
(
m¯′
)
1{ξ (m,m′)=L}.
As σ is coordinated, it follows that 1− pm is the probability that the players coordinate on R, condi-
tional on the agent sending message m.
Let p¯ = maxm∈M pm be the maximal probability, and let p = minm∈M pm be the minimal prob-
ability. By definition, p ≤ p¯. As σ is an equilibrium strategy, p < p¯ implies that all types u < 1/2
send a message inducing probability p¯ and all types u> 1/2 send a message inducing probability p.
Therefore, the expected payoff of a type u≤ 1/2 is given by piu (σ ,σ) = p¯ (1−u)+(1− p¯)u, and the
expected payoff of any type u> 1/2 is equal to piu (σ ,σ) = p(1−u)+
(
1− p
)
u. This is also true if
p = p¯. Note that for types u < 1/2, the expected payoff strictly increases in p¯ and for types u > 1/2
the type’s expected payoff strictly decreases in p.
We consider three cases. Suppose first that p ≤ p¯ ≤ F(1/2). Then let σ ′ = σR. This strategy is
also coordinated and its induced payoffs can be written in the same form as those for strategy σ with
p′ = 0 and p¯′ = F(1/2). Thus, we get that piu (σ ′,σ ′) ≥ piu (σ ,σ) for every u ∈ [0,1]. This implies
that σ is either interim (pre-communication) payoff equivalent to or Pareto-dominated by σ ′ = σR.
The second case where F(1/2)≤ p≤ p¯ is analogous to the first one, with σ ′ = σL.
In the final case p < F(1/2) < p¯. Let α ∈ [0,1] be such that F(1/2)+ (1−F(1/2))α = p¯ and let
σ ′ be a renegotiation-proof strategy with left tendency α . Then p≥ αF(1/2) and by construction σ
is either interim (pre-communication) payoff equivalent to or Pareto dominated by σ ′.
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 5 we have that every coordinated equilibrium strategy σ is in-
terim (pre-communication) Pareto-dominated by some renegotiation-proof strategy with some left
tendency α ∈ [0,1] denoted by σα . We thus have that pi (σ ,σ)≤ pi (σα ,σα).
The ex-ante expected payoff of to a u type under strategy σα is given by
piu (σα ,σα) = (1−u)
[
F(12)+α
(
1−F(12)
)]
+u(1−α)
(
1−F(12)
)
for u≤ 1/2 and
piu (σα ,σα) = (1−u)αF(12)+u
[
1−F(12)+(1−α)F(
1
2)
]
for u> 1/2.
It is straightforward to verify that piu (σα ,σα) = αpiu (σ1,σ1)+(1−α)piu (σ0,σ0) . for every u.
As σ1 = σL and σ0 = σR and as for all u ∈ [0,1] piu (σα ,σα) is the same convex combination of
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piu (σL,σL) and piu (σR,σR), we have pi (σα ,σα) = αpi (σ1,σ1)+ (1−α)pi (σ0,σ0), which implies
that pi (σ ,σ)≤ pi (σα ,σα)≤max{pi (σL,σL) ,pi (σR,σR)}.
B More on Properties of Strategies
In this appendix we demonstrate that no single one of the three properties (mutual-preference con-
sistency, coordination, and binary communication) is implied by the other two. Clearly a strategy
that has binary communication and is coordinated must be an equilibrium. No other combination
of two of the three properties implies that a strategy is an equilibrium. Finally, we also define what
it means for a strategy to be ordinal preference-revealing and show that this is implied by it being
mutual-preference consistent.
Consider the following strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) in the game with communication with a message set
M that contains at least three elements. Let m1L,m
2
L,mR ∈M, let
µ(u) =


m1L if u≤
1
4
m2L if
1
4 < u≤
1
2
mR if u> 12
,
and let ξ be such that ξ (miL,m
j
L)= L for all i, j∈{1,2}, ξ (mR,mR)=R, ξ (m
1
L,mR)= ξ (mR,m
1
L)=R,
and ξ (m2L,mR) = ξ (mR,m
2
L) = L. This strategy is mutual-preference consistent and coordinated but
does not have binary communication. It is not an equilibrium as types u≤ 1/4 would strictly prefer
to send message m2L.
Consider the following strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) in the game with communication with a message set
M that contains at least two elements. Let mL,mR ∈M, let
µ(u) =
{
mL if u≤ 12
mR if u> 12
,
and let ξ be such that ξ (mL,mL) = L, ξ (mR,mR) = R, ξ (mL,mR) = 1/4, and ξ (mR,mL) = 3/4. This
strategy is mutual-preference consistent, has binary communication, but is not coordinated. For
almost all type distributions F this is not an equilibrium: it is only an equilibrium if F satisfies
(F(3/4)−F(1/2))/(1−F(1/2)) = 1/4 and F(1/4)/F(1/2) = 3/4.
Finally, for a strategy that has binary communication and is coordinated but not mutual-preference
consistent, consider the equilibrium strategy that always leads to coordination on action L for any
pair of messages.
Note also that an equilibrium does not necessarily satisfy any of the three properties. The interior
cutoff babbling equilibria mentioned in Section 3 are not coordinated and not mutual-preference
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consistent. The equilibrium of Example 1 does not have binary communication.
Call a strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) ∈ Σ ordinal preference-revealing if there exist two nonempty, disjoint,
and exhaustive subsets of supp(µ¯) denoted by ML and MR (i.e., supp(µ¯) = ˙ML
⋃
MR) such that if
u< 1/2, then µu(m) = 0 for each m ∈MR, and if u> 1/2, then µu(m) = 0 for each m ∈ML. With an
ordinal preference-revealing strategy a player indicates her ordinal preferences. A strategy σ that is
mutual-preference consistent is also ordinal preference-revealing (but not vice versa). Suppose not.
Then there is a message m and two types u < 1/2 and v > 1/2 such that µu(m),µv(m) > 0. But then
no matter how we specify ξ (m,m) we get either that if two types u meet they do not coordinate on L
with probability one or if two types v meet they do not coordinate on R with probability one.
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C Non-binary Communication Equilibrium (Online Appendix)
We here formally present the example, which is discussed informally at the end of Section 3, of an
equilibrium in which agents reveal some information about the cardinality of their preferences.
Suppose that |M| ≥ 4 and consider the game with two rounds of communication. Let e,mL,mR ∈M
and let σ = (µ1,µ2,ξ ), with µ1 :U → ∆(M), µ2 : M×M×U → ∆(M), and ξ : (M×M)
2 →U be as
follows. For the first round of messages there is an x ∈ [0,1] such that
µ1(u) =


e if u≤ x or u> 1− x
mL if x< u≤ 12
mR if 12 < u≤ 1− x.
The second round of messages depends on the outcome of the first round and is best described in the
following table.
e mL mR
e e µ∗ µ∗
mL mL mL µC
mR mR µC mR
Each entry in this table describes the message function that a player follows if her first-stage message is
the one indicated on the left and her opponent’s first-stage message is the one indicated at the top. The
message function µ∗ (after for instance a message pair of (e,mL)) is just as in the definition of σL and
σR (in Section 3). The message function µC is as in the definition of σC with an appropriate relabeling
of four messages in M. The action function is also best given in table form as a function of the result of
the first round of communication (or the second round when so indicated).
e mL mR
e
{
L if u≤ 12
R if u> 12
{
L if u≤ 12
R if u> 12
{
L if u≤ 12
R if u> 12
mL
{
L if µ2 = (mL,mL)
R otherwise
L ξC
mR
{
R if µ2 = (mR,mR)
L otherwise
ξC R
Action function ξC is as defined for σC applied to the second round of communication only.
We can complete the description of this strategy by requiring that all other messages inM be treated
exactly the same as one of the messages e,mL,mR.
Proposition 3. Let F be a nondegenerate symmetric distribution around 1/2, i.e., F(x) = 1−F(1−x) for
all x ∈ [0,1]. Then there is an x ∈ (0, 1/2) such that the above-defined strategy of the coordination game,
1
with two rounds of communication and with |M| ≥ 4, is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the given strategy for an arbitrary x ∈ (0, 1/2). First note that whenever messages lead
the players to coordinate their action then clearly both players are best replying to each other with their
actions. This is so in all cases except when both players send message e in the first round. In this case
players choose L if their type u ≤ 1/2 and R otherwise. Each player, in this case, faces an opponent
that either has u ≤ x or u > 1− x. In the first (second) case the opponent plays L (R). Given that
F(x) = 1−F(1− x) both cases are equally likely. Given this, players’ actions are indeed best replies.
Thus, all action choices are best responses to the given strategy. We now turn to message choices.
Consider the second round. After moderate messages in the first round messages in the second round
either do not affect play at all (after (mL,mL) and (mR,mR)) or do so as in strategy σC. In either case
players are indifferent between all messages. After message pairs (mL,e) and (mR,e) the sender of the
moderate message has a strict incentive to send the same message again, while the sender of the extreme
message has a strict incentive to send mL if her type u < 1/2 or to send mR if her type u > 1/2 as this
induces coordination on her preferred outcome. After both players send message e, play will not depend
on messages in the second round either and so both players will be indifferent between all messages.
Thus, the behavior in the second round of communication is a best response to the given strategy.
Finally, we need to consider the incentives to send messages in the first round. It is obvious that
any type u < 1/2 prefers sending message mL to sending message mR and vice versa for types u > 1/2.
The only remaining thing to show is that types u ≤ x and u > 1− x and only these weakly prefer to
send message e in the first round. Given the symmetry it is without loss of generality to consider a type
u≤ 1/2. Given the strategy, sending message e yields to this type a payoff of
F(x)(1−u)+
(
F(12)−F(x)
)
(1−u)+
(
F(1− x)−F(12)
)
(1−u)+(1−F(1− x))0,
where F(x) is the probability that her opponent is an extreme left type, (F(1/2)−F(x)) is the probability
that the opponent is a moderate left type, (F(1− x)−F(1/2)) is the probability that the opponent is a
moderate right type, in all of which cases both players eventually play L, and where (1−F(1− x)) is
the probability that her opponent is an extreme right type, in which case the two players miscoordinate.
Sending message mL yields a payoff of
F(x)(1−u)+
(
F(12)−F(x)
)
(1−u)+
(
F(1− x)−F(12)
) 1
2 +(1−F(1− x))u.
A type u≤ 1/2 therefore weakly prefers sending message e to sending message mL if and only if
Dx(u)≡
(
F(1− x)−F(12)
)
(1−u)−
(
F(1− x)−F(12)
) 1
2 − (1−F(1− x))u≥ 0.
Using the symmetry of F we can rewrite D(x) as Dx(u) = (1/2−F(x))(1/2−u)−F(x)u.
Note that Dx(u) is linear and downward sloping in u if x ∈ (0, 1/2). In an equilibrium we then must
2
have that Dx(x) = 0. This implies Dx(x) =
(1
2 −F(x)
)(1
2 − x
)
−F(x)x = 0, or, equivalently, Dx(x) =
1
4 −
1
2F(x)−
1
2x= 0. As D0(0) = 1/4 > 0, D1/2(1/2) = −1/4 < 0, and Dx(x) is a continuous function in x,
there is an x ∈ (0, 1/2) such that Dx(x) = 0. For this x the given strategy is thus an equilibrium.
D Evolutionary Stability Analysis (Online Appendix)
In this appendix we analyze the stability of strategies σL and σR (the results can be extended to other
renegotiation-proof equilibria, but we omit the details here for brevity).
D.1 Evolutionary/Neutral Stability
We say that two strategies are almost surely realization equivalent (abbr., equivalent) if they induce the
same behavior in almost all types (regardless of the opponent’s behavior).
Definition 4. A condition holds for almost all types if the set of types that satisfy the condition U˜ ⊆U
has mass one (as measured by the distribution f ), i.e.,
∫
u∈U˜ f (u)du= 1.
Definition 5. Strategies σ = (µ,ξ ) and σ˜ =
(
µ˜ , ξ˜
)
are almost surely realization equivalent (abbr.,
equivalent) if for almost all types u∈ [0,1]: µu (m)= µ˜u (m) for everymessagem∈M, and Fm (ξ (m,m′))=
Fm
(
ξ˜ (m,m′)
)
for all messages m,m′ ∈ supp(µ¯).
If σ and σ˜ are equivalent strategies we denote this by σ ≈ σ˜ . It is immediate that equivalent strategies
always obtain the same ex-ante expected payoff.
An equilibrium strategy σ is neutrally (evolutionarily) stable if it achieves a weakly (strictly) higher
ex-ante expected payoff against any (non-equivalent) best-reply strategy, relative to the payoff that the
best-reply strategy achieves against itself.
Definition 6 (adaptation of Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). Equilibrium strategy σ ∈ E is neutrally
stable if pi (σ˜ ,σ) = pi (σ ,σ) ⇒ pi (σ , σ˜) ≥ pi (σ˜ , σ˜) for any nonequivalent strategy σ˜ 6≈ σ . It is evolu-
tionarily stable if this last weak inequality is replaced by a strict one.
The refinement of neutral stability is arguably a necessary requirement for an equilibrium to be a
stable convention in a population (see, e.g., Banerjee and Weibull, 2000). If σ is an equilibrium strategy
that is not neutrally stable, then a few experimenting agents who play a best-reply strategy σ ′ can invade
the population. These experimenting agents would fare the same against the incumbents, whereas they
would outperform the incumbents when being matched with other experimenting agents. This implies
that, on average, these experimenting agents would be more successful than the incumbents, and their
frequency in the population would increase in any payoff-monotone learning dynamics. This, in turn,
implies that the population will move away from σ .
Our first result shows that both σL and σR are neutrally stable, and, moreover, they are evolutionarily
stable if there are two feasible messages.
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Proposition 4. Strategies σL and σR are neutrally stable strategies of the coordination game with com-
munication 〈Γ,M〉. Moreover, if |M|= 2, then σL and σR are evolutionarily stable strategies.
Proof. We here prove this result for σL. The proof for σR proceeds analogously and is omitted. In order
to prove this result we first characterize all strategies σ that are best responses to σL and thus satisfy
pi(σ ,σL) = pi(σL,σL). Consider the message and action choice of a type u when her opponent uses
strategy σL. If our type u chooses any message other than mR, her opponent, sending message mL or
mR, plays action L in either case. Our type u could then choose action L (as prescribed by σL), which
provides a payoff of 1−u, or action R, which provides a payoff of zero. Thus all types u< 1 are strictly
better off choosing action L in this case. Also note that sending any message other than mL leads to a
best possible payoff of 1−u.
If our type u chooses to send message mR then there are two cases. First, suppose that her opponent
sends message mL, in which case her opponent chooses action L. Our type u could then choose action L
(as prescribed by σL), which provides a payoff of 1−u, or action Rwhich provides a payoff of zero. Thus
all types u < 1 are strictly better off choosing action L in this case. Second, suppose that her opponent
sends message mR, in which case her opponent chooses action R. Our type u could then choose action R
(as prescribed by σL), which provides a payoff of u, or action L which provides a payoff of zero. Thus
all types u> 0 are strictly better off choosing action R in this case. Note that sending message mR thus
provides a best possible payoff of F(1/2)(1−u)+(1−F(1/2))u.
For type u it is then a strict best response to send messagemR if F(1/2)(1−u)+(1−F(1/2))u> 1−u,
which is the case if and only if u> 1/2 (as F(1/2)∈ (0,1) by assumption). For the case of |M|= 2 we then
have that any best response to σL is equivalent to σL as only three possible types have an alternative best
reply: types u= 0, u= 1/2, and u= 1 (all zero measures under the assumption of an atomless distribution
F). Any strategy that differs from σL for a positive measure of types yields a strictly inferior payoff
against σL than σL does. This proves that σL is evolutionarily stable in the case of |M| = 2 simply by
virtue of the fact that there are no nonequivalent strategies σ that satisfy pi(σ ,σL) = pi(σL,σL).
Suppose from now on that |M|> 2. Our type u then has a choice of messages m 6= mR when u< 1/2.
All of these messages can at best lead to a payoff of u (from playing L,L) and, therefore, all of them are
equally good when playing against σL. As her opponent never chooses any message other than mL or
mR (each has probability zero under σL) our type u< 1/2 when best responding can play anything after
any message pair (m,m′) when both m,m′ 6∈ {mL,mR}. Let σ be a strategy that satisfies all the previous
restrictions, where all types u play a (in most cases unique and strict) best response against σL. Then
we have that piu(σ ,σ) = piu(σL,σ) for all u≥ 1/2 (as the behavior under σ for types u≥ 1/2 (except for
possibly types u = 1/2 and u = 1) is identical to that under σL), piu(σ ,σ) ≤ 1− u for all u < 1/2 (since
this type can achieve at best 1− u), and piu(σL,σ) = 1− u (since σ similarly to σL prescribes playing
L in this case). We thus have for any such σ by construction pi(σ ,σL) = pi(σL,σL). We also have that
pi(σL,σ)≥ pi(σ ,σL) for any such σ . Finally any best-reply strategy to strategy σL must be equivalent to
some such strategy σ and thus σL is neutrally stable.
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D.2 Message Function is Dominant
Next we show that the first-stage behavior induced by strategy σL (resp., σR), namely, the message
function µ∗, is weakly dominant (and strictly dominant when |M| = 2), when taking as given that the
behavior in the second stage is according to the action function ξL (resp., ξR). This suggests that the
behavior in the first stage that is induced by σL (resp., by σR) is robust to any perturbation that keeps the
behavior in the second stage unchanged. Specifically, it implies that even if the message function used
by the population is perturbed in an arbitrary (and possibly significant) way, then the original function
µ∗ yields a weakly higher payoff than any other message function, which suggests that the behavior in
the first stage would converge back to play µ∗ under any payoff-monotone learning dynamics.
Proposition 5 shows that message function µ∗ yields a weakly higher payoff relative to any other
message function when the action function is given by ξL or ξR. Moreover, the inequality is strict
whenever the alternative message function is essentially different from µ∗ in the sense of inducing low
types to play mR or inducing high types to play m 6= mR.
Proposition 5. Let µ ′,µ ′′ be arbitrary message functions. Then for, ξ ∈ {ξL,ξR} and for any type u 6= 1/2,
piu
(
(µ∗,ξ ) ,
(
µ ′,ξ
))
≥ piu
((
µ ′′,ξ
)
,
(
µ ′,ξ
))
.
This inequality is strict for ξ = ξL if µ
′
u(mR)> 0 for a positive measure of types u and, either µ
′′
u (mR)> 0
for a positive measure of types u < 1/2, or µ ′′u (mR) < 1 for a positive measure of types u > 1/2. This
inequality is strict for ξ = ξR if µ
′
u(mL)> 0 for a positive measure of types u and, either µ
′′
u (mL)> 0 for
a positive measure of types u> 1/2, or µ ′′u (mL)< 1 for a positive measure of types u< 1/2.
Proof. Consider the case of ξ = ξL (the other case is proven analogously). Let γ denote the probability
that a player following strategy (µ ′,ξL) sends message mR. Then sending any message other than mR
when the partner sends (µ ′,ξL) yields a payoff of 1− u, and sending message mR yields a payoff of
γu+ (1− γ)(1− u). Thus any type u > 1/2 weakly prefers sending message mR to sending any other
message (and strictly prefers this if γ > 0), while any type u < 1/2 weakly prefers sending any message
other thanmR to sending messagemR (and strictly prefers this if γ < 1). Thus, for every message function
µ ′ of the opponent, µ∗ optimizes the message choice for every type u universally.
D.3 Action Function is a Neighborhood Invader Strategy
In the induced second-stage game Γ(Fm,Fm′) (the game played after players observe a pair of messages
(m,m′)), players choose a cutoff to determine whether to play action L (if their type is below or equal to
that cutoff) or action R (otherwise). Thus, players essentially choose a number (their cutoff) from the unit
interval. Note also that this induced game is asymmetric whenever the message profile is asymmetric,
i.e., when m 6= m′. As argued by Eshel and Motro (1981) and Eshel (1983), when the set of strategies
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is a continuum, a stable convention should be robust to perturbations that slightly change the strategy
played by all agents in the population. Cressman (2010) formalizes this requirement using the notion of
neighborhood invader strategy (adapting the related notion of Apaloo, 1997). In what follows we show
that the action function induced by σL and σR is a neighborhood invader strategy in any induced game
Γ(Fm,Fm′) on the path of play.
Fix a message function µ and a pair of messages m1,m2 ∈ supp(µ¯). We identify a strategy in the
induced game Γ(Fm1 ,Fm2) with thresholds xi, which is interpreted as the maximal type for which player
i∈ {1,2} plays L. We say that strategy xi of player i is equivalent to x′i (denoted by xi ≈ x
′
i) in the induced
game Γ(Fm1 ,Fm2), if Fmi (xi)= Fmi (x
′
i), which implies that both thresholds induce the same behavior with
probability one. Let pim1,m2 (x1,x2) denote the expected payoff of an agent with a random type sampled
from fm1 who uses threshold x1 when facing a partner with a random unknown type sampled from fm2
who uses threshold x2.
A strategy profile (x1,x2) is a strict equilibrium if any best reply to x j is equivalent to xi, i.e.,
pim1,m2 (x′1,x2)≥ pi
m1,m2 (x1,x2)⇒ x
′
1 ≈ x1, and pi
m2,m1 (x′2,x1)≥ pi
m2,m1 (x2,x1)⇒ x
′
2 ≈ x2.
We say that the strict equilibrium (x1,x2) is a neighborhood invader strategy in the induced game
Γ(Fm1,Fm2) if the population converges to (x1,x2) from any nonequivalent nearby strategy profile (x
′
1,x
′
2)
in two steps: (1) strategy xi yields a strictly higher payoff against x j relative to the payoff of x′i against x j
(which implies convergence from
(
x′i,x
′
j
)
to
(
xi,x
′
j
)
), and (2) due to (x1,x2) being a strict equilibrium,
strategy x j yields a strictly higher payoff against xi relative to the payoff of x′j against xi (which implies
the convergence from
(
xi,x
′
j
)
to
(
xi,x j
)
).
Definition 7 (Adaptation of Cressman, 2010, Def. 5). Fix a message function µ and a pair of mes-
sages m1,m2 ∈ supp(µ¯). A strict Nash equilibrium (x1,x2) is a neighborhood invader strategy profile in
Γ(Fm1,Fm2) if there exists ε > 0, such that for each (x
′
1,x
′
2) satisfying x
′
1 6≈ x1, x
′
2 6≈ x2, |x
′
1− x1|< ε and
|x′2− x2|< ε , then either pi
m1,m2 (x1,x
′
2)> pi
m1,m2 (x′1,x
′
2) or pi
m2,m1 (x2,x
′
1)> pi
m2,m1 (x′2,x
′
1).
Proposition 6 shows that the profile of action functions induced by σL (or, similarly, by σR) is a
neighborhood invader strategy in any induced game.
Proposition 6. Let m1,m2 ∈ supp(µ¯
∗). Then both strategy profiles (ξL (m1,m2) ,ξL (m2,m1)) and
(ξR (m1,m2) ,ξR (m2,m1)) are strict equilibria and neighborhood invader strategy profiles in ΓFm1 ,Fm2 .
Proof. We present the proof for (ξL (m1,m2) ,ξL (m2,m1)) (the proof for ξR is analogous). Observe that
m1,m2 ∈ supp(µ¯∗) implies one of three cases: m1 = m2 = mL, m1 = m2 = mR, or m1 = mR,m2 = mL.
We analyze each case as follows.
Suppose first that m1 = m2 = mL. This implies that ξL (m1,m2) = ξL (m2,m1) = 1 and Fm1 (1/2) =
Fm2 (
1/2) = 1. Let x¯ < 1/2 be sufficiently close to 1/2 such that Fm1 (x¯) ,Fm2 (x¯) > 1/2. Observe that
pim1,m2 (1,x) > pim1,m2 (y,x) for any x > x¯ and any y 6≈ 1. This proves that (ξL (m1,m2) ,ξL (m2,m1))
is a strict equilibrium and a neighborhood invader strategy profile. Now suppose that m1 = m2 = mR.
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This implies that ξL (m1,m2) = ξL (m2,m1) = 0 and Fm1 (1/2) = Fm2 (1/2) = 0. Let x¯ > 1/2 be sufficiently
close to 1/2 such that Fm1 (x¯) ,Fm2 (x¯) < 1/2. Observe that pi
m1,m2 (0,x) > pim1,m2 (y,x) for any x < x¯ and
any y 6≈ 0. This proves that (ξL (m1,m2) ,ξL (m2,m1)) is a strict equilibrium and neighborhood invader.
Suppose finally that m1 = mR, m2 = mL. This implies that ξL (m1,m2) = ξL (m2,m1) = 1, Fm1 (1/2) =
0, and Fm2 (1/2)= 1. Observe that pi
m1,m2 (1,1)> pim1,m2 (x,1) for any x 6≈ 1 and pim2,m1 (1,1)> pim2,m1 (x,1)
for any x 6≈ 1, which implies that (ξL (m1,m2) ,ξL (m2,m1)) is a strict equilibrium. Let x¯ > 1/2 be suffi-
ciently close to 1/2 such that Fm1 (x¯)< 1/2. Observe that pi
m2,m1 (1,x)> pim1,m2 (y,x) for any x< x¯ and any
y 6≈ 1. This proves that (ξL (m1,m2) ,ξL (m2,m1)) is a neighborhood invader strategy profile.
D.4 Remark on Evolutionary Robustness
Oechssler and Riedel (2002) present a strong notion of stability, called evolutionary robustness, that
refines both evolutionary stability and the neighborhood invader strategy. An evolutionary robust strategy
σ∗ is required to be robust against small perturbation in the strategy played by the population, which may
comprise both (1) a few experimenting agents who follow arbitrary strategies, and (2) many agents who
follow strategies that are only slightly different than σ∗. Specifically, if σ is a distribution of strategies
that is sufficiently close to σ∗ (in the L1 norm induced by the weak topology), evolutionary robustness à
la Oechssler and Riedel requires that pi (σ∗,σ)> (σ ,σ).
One can show that σL and σR do not satisfy this condition (and, we conjecture, that no strategy can
satisfy this condition in our setup). However, we conjecture that one can show that σL and σR satisfy a
somewhat weaker notion of evolutionary robustness: for each strategy distribution σ sufficiently close to
σL (σR), there exists a finite sequence of strategy distributionsσ1,σ2, . . . ,σk, such that pi (σ1,σ)≥ (σ ,σ),
pi (σ2,σ1) ≥ (σ1,σ1), . . . , pi (σk,σk−1) ≥ (σk−1,σk−1), and pi (σL,σ1) ≥ (σ1,σ1) (resp., pi (σR,σ1) ≥
(σ1,σ1)), with strict inequalities if |M|= 2 and σ is not realization equivalent to σL (σR).
E Analysis of the Extensions of Section 8 (Online Appendix)
E.1 Multiple Rounds of Communication
Consider a variant of the coordination game with communication in which players have T ≥ 1 of rounds
of communication. In each such round players simultaneously send messages from the set M. Players
observe messages after each round and can, thus, condition their message choice and then their final ac-
tion choice on the history of observed message pairs up to the point in time where they take their message
or action decision. Renegotiation then possibly takes place once at the end of this communication phase
but before the final action choices are made. Let M =
⋃T−1
t=0 (M×M)
t, where (M×M)0 = /0.
A (pure) message protocol is a function m : M →M that describes the message sent by an agent as
a deterministic function of the message profiles observed in the previous rounds of communication.
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Let M be the set of all message protocols. A strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) is a pair where µ : U → ∆(M)
denotes the message function, prescribing a (possibly random) message protocol for each type, and
ξ : (M×M)T →U denotes the action function by means of describing the cutoff (the highest possible
value of u) for the two players to choose action L after observing the final message history. Renegotiation
is modeled, as in the main text, as a possibility for the two players to play an equilibrium of a new game
with another round of communication after all messages are sent, possibly using a different message set.
Next, we adapt the notion of binary communication to fit multiple rounds of communication. For
any message protocol m ∈M, let β σ (m) denote the expected probability of a player’s opponent playing
L conditional on the player following message protocol m ∈M and the opponent following strategy
σ = (µ,ξ ) ∈ Σ. We say that strategy σ has binary communication if there are two numbers 0 ≤ β σ ≤
β
σ
≤ 1 such that for all message protocolsm ∈M we have β σ (m) ∈ [β σ ,β
σ
], for all message protocols
m ∈M such that there is a type u < 1/2 with µu(m) > 0 we have β σ (m) = β
σ
, and for all message
protocols m ∈M such that there is a type u> 1/2 with µu(m)> 0 we have β σ (m) = β
σ . That is, binary
communication implies that players use just two kinds of message protocols: any message protocol
used by types u < 1/2 induces the consequence of maximizing the probability of the opponent to play
L, and any message protocol used by types u> 1/2 induces the opposite consequence of maximizing the
probability of the opponent to play R.
Theorem 1, together with Propositions 1 and 2, holds in this setting with minor adaptations to the
proof (omitted for brevity). Thus, regardless of the length of the pre-play communication, agents can
reveal only their preferred outcome (but not the strength of their preference), and, regardless of having
access to additional rounds of communication, they cannot improve the ex-ante expected payoff relative
to the payoff induced by a single round of communication with a binary message.
E.2 Multidimensional Sets of Types
In our model we made the simplifying assumption that miscoordination provides the same payoff (nor-
malized to zero) to both players. This is not completely innocuous. In this section we explore which
results are still true in this more general setting. Consider the following multidimensional set of types.
Let Uˆ , a subset of IR4, be the set of payoff matrices of binary coordination games, with uab being the
payoff if a player chooses action a ∈ {L,R} while her opponent chooses action b ∈ {L,R}:
Uˆ = {(uLL,uLR,uRL,uRR) | uLL > uRL and uRR > uLR} .
Thus, all types strictly prefer coordination on the same action as the partner to miscoordination. Note
that any affine transformation of all payoffs neither changes the player’s incentives nor changes how
she compares any two outcome distributions ∈ ∆({L,R}). We can thus subtract min{uRL,uLR} from all
payoffs and then divide all payoffs by some number such that the sum of the diagonal entries is equal
to one. This leaves two parameters to describe a payoff vector in Uˆ . This means that for our purposes
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the set Uˆ is two-dimensional. Let Γˆ = Γˆ(G) denote the coordination game with the two-dimensional
type space Uˆ , endowed with an atomless CDF G over Uˆ with a density g. Similarly, let 〈Γˆ,M〉 be the
corresponding game with communication.
Given a type u = (uLL,uLR,uRL,uRR), let ϕu ∈ [0,1] denote type u’s indifference threshold, which is
the probability of the opponent playing L that induces an agent of type u to be indifferent:
ϕu =
uRR−uLR
uLL−uRL+uRR−uLR
.
Observe that an agent with indifference threshold ϕu, where ϕu is a number always between 0 and 1,
prefers to play L (R) if her partner plays L with probability larger (smaller) than ϕu. In other words, for
a given probability of her partner playing L, a type u prefers to play L if and only if ϕu is less than that
probability. Thus, the indifference threshold ϕu replaces what we denoted by u in the main model. In
particular, in this setting we can also restrict attention to cutoff action functions. These are now applied
to ϕu instead of to u. Thus, under a strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) a player plays action L after observing a message
pair (m,m′) if and only if ϕu ≤ ξ (m,m′).
Recall, that action L is risk-dominant (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) if it is a best reply against the
opponent randomizing equally over the two actions, i.e., if ϕu ≤ 1/2 ⇔ uLL−uLR ≥ uRR−uRL.
The crucial assumption that we implicitly made in our (one-dimensional) main model is that for any
type of player the action that she prefers to coordinate on is also risk-dominant for her.
Definition 8. An atomless distribution over the payoff spaceU with density function g :U → IR satisfies
unambiguous coordination preferences if for any u ∈U with g(u)> 0 we have uLL ≥ uRR ⇔ ϕu ≤ 1/2.
Under a distribution over types with unambiguous coordination preferences, every type in its support
prefers coordinating on action L iff that type finds action L risk dominant. Under the assumption that the
distribution satisfies unambiguous coordination preferences, Thm. 1 goes through unchanged if we set
F(ϕ) =
∫
{u∈U :ϕu≤ϕ}
g(u)du
to be the implied distribution over the players’ indifference threshold induced by density g. As in the
baseline model, we assume that F(ϕ) has full support on the interval [0,1].
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1 adapted to a multidimensional set of types). A strategy σ of a game 〈Γˆ,M〉 that
satisfies unambiguous coordination preferences is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy if and only
if it is mutual-preference consistent, coordinated, and has binary communication.
The proof is presented in Appendix E.7.1. The intuition is the same as in Theorem 1. The adaptation
of Lemma 2, to the current setup relies on having unambiguous coordination preferences.
While we cannot say that the restriction of unambiguous coordination preferences is necessary for
the result, we present an example that suggests that if this restriction is not satisfied, then equilibria with
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miscoordination may be renegotiation-proof.
Example 2. There are four possible preference types as follows:
uL1 L R
L 2 1⁄2
R 0 1
uL2 L R
L 2 -8
R 0 1
uR1 L R
L 1 0
R 1⁄2 2
uR2 L R
L 1 0
R -8 2
Define the distribution of types F such that18 P(uL1) = P(uR1) = 1/8 and P(uL2) = P(uR2) = 3/8.
Let M = {mL,mR} and let σ = (µ,ξ ) be such that µ (uL1) = µ (uL2) = mL and µ (uR1) = µ (uR2) =
mR (making σ mutual-preference consistent), and ξ (mL,mL) = L, ξ (mR,mR) = R, ξ (uL1,mL,mR) =
ξ (uR2,mR,mL) = L, and ξ (uL2,mL,mR) = R as well as ξ (uR1,mR,mL) = R.
It is straightforward to verify that σ is an equilibrium.19 Note that it is mutual-preference consistent
and has binary communication, but it is not coordinated. We now show that σ is not Pareto-dominated by
any coordinated equilibrium strategy in any induced post-communication game. To see this note that the
non-coordinated equilibrium following (mL,mR) is not Pareto-dominated by any coordinated equilibrium
σα with left tendency of α (with additional communication): under σα the expected payoff of an agent,
conditional on observing message pair (mL,mR), is given by (3/4) ·2+(1/4) · (1/2) = 1+ 5/8 for types uL1
and uR1, and equal to 1/4 for types uL2 and uR2. In order to induce a payoff of at least 1+ 5/8 to type uL1
with any coordinated equilibrium strategy σα , it must be that α ≥ 5/8, while in order to induce a payoff
of at least 1+ 5/8 to type uL2, it must be that α ≤ 3/8. Thus, there is no α that satisfies both requirements.
Note, however, that any strategy that is coordinated and mutual-preference consistent and has bi-
nary communication is renegotiation-proof also in the general setting, and that only the other direction
may fail without the assumption of unambiguous coordination preferences. There may be additional
renegotiation-proof equilibria in the general setting. One can show that any such renegotiation-proof
equilibrium strategy must satisfy mutual-preference consistency, but need not satisfy the other two prop-
erties (namely, coordination and binary communication).
E.3 More Than Two Players
Consider a variant of the coordination game in which there are n ≥ 2 players who play a symmetric
coordination game (with private values) with pre-play communication. The action set is {L,R} for every
player and the payoff to player i is equal to ui if every player chooses action R, equal to 1−ui if every
player chooses L, and equal to zero otherwise. The payoff to type ui is independent and identically drawn
from some given distribution F with support in the unit interval [0,1]. Before players choose actions,
18This distribution is discrete, but could easily be modified to a nearby atomless distribution without changing the result.
19The expected payoffs are: 12 · 2+
1
2 ·
( 3
4 ·2+
1
4 ·
1
2
)
= 1+ 1316 for types uL1 and uR1, and
1
2 · 2+
1
2 ·
1
4 · 1 = 1+
1
8 for types
uL2 and uR2. This implies that no type wants to misreport her preferred outcome in round one. In particular, a misreporting
type uL2 will get a payoff of 12 ·1+
1
2 ·
3
4 ·1=
7
8 < 1+
1
8 .
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they simultaneously send messages from a finite set of messages M and observe all these messages. Let
〈Γn,M〉 denote this n-player coordination game with pre-play communication.
In this setting the appropriate version of Theorem 1 still holds.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 1 adapted to more than two players). A strategy σ of the n-player coordination
game 〈Γn,M〉 is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy if and only if it is mutual-preference consis-
tent, coordinated, and has binary communication.
Sketch of proof; for the formal proof see Appendix E.7.2. The proof of the “only if” direction has to be
adapted (the proof of the “if” direction remains, essentially, the same). In this setting it is not generally
true that any play that involves miscoordination is post-communication Pareto-dominated by σL, σR,or
σC. The proof instead first establishes that miscoordination after all players send the samemessage must
be Pareto-dominated by either σL or σR (Lemma 7). This is then used to show that a renegotiation-
proof equilibrium strategy must be mutual-preference consistent (Lemma 8). Then one can show that a
renegotiation-proof strategy must be coordinated and must have binary communication (Lemma 9).
Prop. 1 and Cor. 1 also hold in the multi-player setting: renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategies
are interim (pre-communication) Pareto-undominated and Pareto-improving relative to all symmetric
equilibria of the game without communication. By contrast, Prop. 2 does not extend to this setting: with
three players, for instance, for some distributions of values F , the strategy that determines the fallback
option by majority vote (in the case of messages that indicate different preferred actions) is an ex-ante
payoff improvement over a simple fallback norm of choosing, say, action L in every case of disagreement.
E.4 Asymmetric Coordination Games
Adapted Model Consider a setup similar to our baseline model except that the distributions of the types
of the two players’ positions differ: the type of player 1 is distributed according to F1 and the type of
player 2 is distributed according to F2. As in the baseline model, both distributions are assumed to be
atomless with full support in [0,1]. Let 〈Γ(F1,F2) ,M〉 denote the asymmetric coordination game with
communication (to ease notation, we assume that both players have the same set of messages at their
disposal). Let Σi denote the set of all strategies of player i ∈ {1,2}. We let i denote the index of one
player and j denote the index of the opponent.
Remark 7. The game 〈Γ(F,F) ,M〉 in which both players have the same distribution of types corresponds
to a setup, in which the payoff-irrelevant position of player 1 or player 2 is identifiable, and the players
can condition their play on their positions.
Given a strategy profile (σ1,σ2), let pi iu (σ1,σ2) denote the (interim) payoff of type u of player i ∈
{1,2}, and let pi i (σ1,σ2) = IEu∼Fi
[
pi iu (σ1,σ2)
]
denote the ex-ante payoff of player i ∈ {1,2}. A strategy
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profile (σ1,σ2) is an equilibrium if pi1u (σ1,σ2)≥ pi
1
u (σ
′
1,σ2) for each strategy σ
′
1 ∈ Σ
1 and for each type
u of player 1, and pi2u (σ1,σ2)≥ pi
2
u (σ1,σ
′
2) for each strategy σ
′
2 ∈ Σ
2 and for each type u of player 2.
Adapted Properties We adapt the three key properties of Section 3 as follows. Let µ iu (mi) denote
the probability, given message function µ i, that player i sends message mi if she is of type ui. Let
µ i (mi) = IEu∼Fi
[
µ iu (mi)
]
be the average (ex-ante) probability of player i sending messagemi. A strategy
profile (σ1,σ2) is mutual-preference consistent if whenever u1,u2 < 1/2 then ξ1 (m1,m2) = ξ2 (m1,m2) =
L for allm1 ∈ supp
(
µ1u
)
and m2 ∈ supp
(
µ2u
)
, and whenever u1,u2 > 1/2 then ξ1 (m1,m2) = ξ2 (m1,m2) =
R for all m1 ∈ supp
(
µ1u
)
and m2 ∈ supp
(
µ2u
)
.
A strategy profile (σ1,σ2) is coordinated if ξ1 (m1,m2) = ξ2 (m1,m2) ∈ {L,R} for each pair of mes-
sages m1 ∈ supp
(
µ1
)
and m2 ∈ supp
(
µ2
)
.
For any strategy profile σ =
(
(µ1,ξ1),(µ
2,ξ2)
)
∈ Σ1×Σ2 and any message m j ∈M, define
β σi (m j) = Eu∼Fi
[
∑
mi∈M
µ iu(mi)1{u≤ξi(mi,m j)}
]
as the expected probability of player i playing L conditional on player j sending message m j ∈M. We
say that strategy profile σ = (σ1,σ2) has (essentially) binary communication if there are two pairs of
numbers 0 ≤ β σ
1
≤ β
σ
1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ β
σ
2
≤ β
σ
2 ≤ 1 such that for all messages m ∈ M and each player
i ∈ {1,2} we have β σi (m) ∈ [β
σ
i
,β
σ
i ]; for all messages m ∈ M such that there is a type u < 1/2 with
µ
j
u(m) > 0 we have β σi (m) = β
σ
i ; and for all messages m ∈ M such that there is a type u > 1/2 with
µu(m)> 0 we have β σi (m) = β
σ
i
.
Consider a strategy profile σ = (σ1,σ2) that is coordinated and mutual-preference consistent and has
binary communication. Then there are ασ1 ,α
σ
2 ∈ [0,1] such that, for each i ∈ {1,2},
β σ
i
=
(
1−Fj(12)
)
ασi and β
σ
i = Fj(
1
2)+
(
1−Fj(12)
)
ασi ,
where ασi is the probability of coordination on L conditional on player i having type ui < 1/2 and player
j having type ui > 1/2. We refer to ασ =
(
ασ1 ,α
σ
2
)
as the left-tendency profile of a strategy profile
σ that is coordinated and mutual-preference consistent and has binary communication. It is simple
to see that the set of strategies satisfying the above three properties (coordination, mutual-preference
consistency, and binary communication) is essentially two-dimensional because the left-tendency profile
ασ =
(
ασ1 ,α
σ
2
)
of such a strategy profile σ describes all payoff-relevant aspects. Two such strategy
profiles σ and σ ′ with the same left-tendency profile (i.e., with ασ = ασ
′
) can only differ in the way
in which the players implement the joint lottery when they have different preferred outcomes, but these
implementation differences are not payoff-relevant, as the probability of the joint lottery inducing the
players to play L remains the same.
Adaptation of Renegotiation-proofness Given a strategy profile of the game 〈Γ,M〉 we denote the
induced “renegotiation” game after a positive probabilitymessage pairm1,m2 ∈M is sent by 〈Γ(Fm1,Fm2),M˜〉.
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For a strategy profile σ ′ of such a renegotiation game 〈Γ(G1,G2),M˜〉, define the post-communication ex-
pected payoffs for a player i of type u by
pi i,G2u
(
σ ′
)
= IEv∼G2
[
pi iu,v
(
σ ′
)]
≡
∫ 1
v=0
pi iu,v
(
σ ′
)
g2 (v)dv.
Define E (G1,G2) as the set of all (possibly asymmetric) equilibrium profiles of the coordination game
with communication 〈Γ(G1,G2),M˜〉 for some finite message set M˜.
We say that a strategy profile σ is post-communication equilibrium Pareto-dominated if there is a
pair of messages m1 ∈ supp(µ1) and m2 ∈ supp(µ2) and an equilibrium profile σ˜ ∈ E (Fm1,Fm2) such
that pi
i,Fmi
u (σ)≤ pi
i,Fmi
u (σ˜) for each player i ∈ {1,2} and all u ∈ supp(Fmi) with strict inequality for some
u ∈ supp(Fmi) of some player i ∈ {1,2}. A strategy profile σ is renegotiation-proof if it is not post-
communication equilibrium Pareto-dominated.
Adapted Results Our main result remains the same in the setup of asymmetric coordination games.
The proof, which is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1, is omitted for brevity.
Theorem 4. A strategy profile σ of 〈Γ(F1,F2) ,M〉 is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy if and
only if it is mutual-preference consistent, coordinated, and has binary communication.
Prop. 1–2 and Cor. 1 can be adapted to the current setup analogously (proofs are omitted for brevity).
E.5 Coordination Games with More Than 2 Actions
Next we extend our main model to games with more than two actions. We consider a coordination game
with two players in which the two players first send one message from a finite message set M and then,
after observing the message pair, choose one action from the ordered set A= (a1, . . . ,ak)with 2< k< ∞.
A player’s type is now a vector u = (u1, . . . ,uk) ∈ [0,1]
k, where we interpret the i-th component
ui as the payoff of the agent if both players choose action ai. If the players choose different actions
(miscoordinate), then they both get a payoff of zero. We assume that the distribution of types F is a
continuous (atomless) distribution with full support in [0,1]k. For each action ai, let pi be the probability
that the preferred action of a random type is ai (i.e., the probability that ui = max({u1, . . . ,uk})). Let
〈ΓA,M〉= 〈ΓA (F) ,M〉 be the coordination game with set of actions A and pre-play communication.
A player’s (ex-ante) strategy is a pair σ = (µ,ξ ), where µ :U → ∆(M) is a message function that
describes which message is sent for each possible realization of the player’s type, and ξ :M×M×U →
∆(A) is an action function that describes the distribution of actions chosen as a measurable function of
the player’s type and the observed message profile. That is, when a player of type u who follows strategy
(µ,ξ ) observes a message profile (m,m′), then this player plays action ai with probability ξu (m,m′)(ai).
As in the main model, this game has many equilibria. For every action there is a babbling equilibrium
in which players of all types after observing any message pair play this action. For every pair of actions
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ai,a j there are also equilibria in which players send only one of two messages, one message indicating a
preference for ai and another for not ai with play coordinated on ai if both players send the appropriate
message and play coordinated on a j otherwise. None of these equilibria are renegotiation-proof as they
are not mutual-preference consistent and mutual-preference consistency is a necessary condition for a
strategy to be renegotiation-proof also in the present context, as we shall see below.
It is more difficult to find equilibria that are mutual-preference consistent, that is equilibria in which
each player indicates her most preferred action out of all k actions and play is coordinated on that action
if both players indicate a preference for it. Simple adaptations of σL and σR are not equilibria in the
present context. To see this, consider a strategy in which there is a “fallback” action, say action a1, in
which players indicate their most preferred action (the action with the highest ui), and in which play is
coordinated on either action ai if both players indicate a preference for it, or coordinated on action a1
otherwise. Suppose that the distribution of types is such that there are two actions ai and a j (unequal
to each other and unequal to a1) with p j > pi. But then there is a player type u = (u1,u2, . . . ,uk) with
ui = max{u1, . . . ,uk}, u j very close to ui, and u1 < u j, who would prefer to indicate a preference for
action a j. Indicating a preference for action ai, under the given strategy, provides her with a payoff
of piui + (1− pi)u1. Indicating a preference for a j yields a payoff of p ju j + (1− p j)u1. But then
for a suitably chosen vector u = (u1,u2, . . . ,uk) the latter expression is greater than the former, which
contradicts the supposition that the given strategy is an equilibrium.
Next we show that a simple adaptation of σC remains a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy
also in this setup. Let m01,m
0
2, . . . ,m
0
k,m
1
1,m
1
2, . . . ,m
1
k ∈M be 2k distinct messages, where the index i of
message mbi is interpreted as denoting that the agent’s preferred outcome is the i-th outcome, and the
index b ∈ {0,1} is interpreted as a random binary number. Let σC = (µC,ξC) be extended to the current
setup as follows. Define µC (u) = 1/2m0i ⊕ 1/2m
1
i , where i = argmin j
{
u j | u j =max{u1, ..,uk}
}
. Thus,
the message function µC induces each agent to reveal her preferred outcome, and to uniformly choose a
binary number (either, zero or one). In the second stage, if both agents share the same preferred outcome
they play it. Otherwise, they coordinate on the preferred action with the smaller index if both agents have
chosen the same random number, and they coordinate on the preferred outcome with the larger index if
both agents have chosen different random numbers, i.e.,
ξC
(
mbi ,m
c
j
)
=

ai (i≤ j and b= c) OR (i≥ j and b 6= c)a j otherwise.
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Strategy σC is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy in the game 〈ΓA,M〉.
Proof. Observe that an agent who sends message mbi obtains an expected payoff of 1/2ui+ 1/2∑
k
j=1 p ju j
when facing a partner who follows strategy σC. As the second term in this sum is the same for all
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messages, an agent of type u sends this message only if ui =max{u1, . . . ,uk}, as required. The remaining
arguments as to why the second-stage behavior is a best reply and why σC is renegotiation-proof are
analogous to the proof of the “if” part of Theorem 1 and are omitted for brevity.
A strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) is same-message coordinated if for all messages m ∈ supp(µ¯) there is an
action ai such that for all u with µu(m) > 0 we have ξ (u,m,m) = ai. In what follows we show that a
necessary condition for a strategy to be a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy is that this strategy is
same-message coordinated and mutual-preference consistent.
Proposition 8. If strategy σ of the game 〈ΓA,M〉 with action set A is renegotiation-proof, then it is
same-message coordinated and mutual-preference consistent.
Sketch of proof; for the formal proof see Appendix E.7.3. To show that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium
strategy is same-message coordinated we cannot, in fact, use the proof of the main theorem because
Lemma 2 crucially depends on the game having only two actions. Instead, we suppose to the contrary that
there is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy in which play is not coordinated after both players have
sent the same message m. This strategy thus induces some nondegenerate probability distribution over
actions after both players send message m. We then construct a post-communication Pareto-dominating
equilibrium of the induced game that is fully coordinated and has a probability of coordination on every
action exactly equal to the probability of this action being played under the original strategy conditional
on observing (m,m), which contradicts the supposition. The construction is achieved by players sending
random messages in such a way that they are indifferent between all messages and this joint lottery is
implemented.20 The proof that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy must be mutual-preference
consistent is then achieved straightforward (by a simple adaptation of Lemma 8).
We are able neither to show nor to provide a counterexample that a renegotiation-proof strategy must
be coordinated after observing a pair of different messages, and that it must have binary communication.
E.6 Extreme Types with Dominant Actions
In this subsection we show how to extend our analysis to a setup in which some types have an extreme
preference for one of the actions such that it becomes a dominant action for them.
Let a < 0 and b > 1. We extend the set of types to be the interval [a,b]. Observe that action L (R)
is a dominant action for any type u< 0 (u> 1) as coordinating on R (L) yields to such a type a negative
payoff of u< 0 (1−u< 0). We call types with a dominant action (i.e., u< 0 or u> 1) extreme, and types
20Using simultaneous communication to implement a jointly controlled lottery was introduced in Aumann and Maschler
(1968) (see also Heller, 2010 for a recent implementation, which is robust to joint deviations). The original implementation
works perfectly if the probabilities of different actions are rational numbers. In Appendix E.7.3 we present a more elaborate
implementation that allows to deal also with irrational numbers in the current setup.
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that do not have a strictly dominant action (i.e., u ∈ [0,1]) moderate. We assume that the cumulative
distribution of types F is continuous (atomless) and has full support in the interval [a,b].
We further assume that the extreme types are a minority both among the agents who prefer action
R and among the agents who prefer L, i.e., F (0) < 1/2F (1/2) and 1−F (1) < 1/2(1−F (1/2)). Next,
we adapt the definitions of coordination and binary communication to the current setup. The original
definition of coordination is too strong in the current setup, as, clearly, when extreme types with different
preferred outcomesmeet theymust miscoordinate. Thus, we present a milder notion. A strategy isweakly
coordinated if whenever twomoderate types meet they never miscoordinate. Note that the definition does
not impose any restriction on what happens when an extreme type meets a moderate type.
The original definition of binariness is too weak in the current setup. This is because coordinated
strategies must allow for some miscoordination between extreme types, which implies that an agent
cares not only about the average probability of the opponent playing left (i.e., β σ (m)), but also about
the total probability of miscoordination. Thus, we strengthen binariness by requiring that there exist two
distributions of messages, which are used by all types below 1/2 and all types above 1/2, respectively.
Formally, a strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) has strongly binary communication if µ (u) = µ (u′) if either u,u′ ≤ 1/2
or u,u′ > 1/2. It is easy to see that the strategies σL,σR,σC defined in Section 3 all satisfy strongly
binary communication. Moreover, one can show, for any α ∈ [0,1], that if there exists a strategy σ that
is coordinated, mutual-preference consistent, and has binary communication with left tendency α , then
there also exists strategy σ˜ with the same properties that is strongly binary communication.
Our next result shows that there exists, essentially, a unique renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy
that is coordinated, mutual-preference consistent, and has strongly binary communication.
Proposition 9. In a coordination game with communication and with dominant action types, a strat-
egy σ that is coordinated, mutual-preference consistent, and has strongly binary communication is a
renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy if and only if it has a left tendency of α =
F(0)
F(0)+(1−F(1)) .
The formal proof is presented in Appendix E.7.4. The key intuition is that given the frequency of
dominant action types F(0) > 0 (of L-dominant action types) and 1−F(1) > 0 (of R-dominant action
types) to make the agent of type u= 1/2 indifferent between signaling a lower than half or higher than half
type we must have a strategy that counterbalances these frequencies of dominant action types. To see
this, consider an adaptation of σL = (µ∗,ξL) to this setting by having extreme types follow their dominant
action in the second stage (and moderate types play in the same way as in the baseline model). Note that
σL is no longer an equilibrium with extreme types. Observe that having a moderate type send message
mR leads to coordination with probability one (sometimes on R and sometimes on L depending on the
opponent’s message), while having a moderate type send message mL leads to coordination (on L only)
with probability F (1)< 1. This implies that agents of type u< 1/2 sufficiently close to 1/2 strictly prefer
sending message mR to sending message mL (as the former induces a higher probability of coordination
on the same action as the partner), which contradicts the supposition that σL is an equilibrium strategy.
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Appendix E.7.4 also shows that a left tendency α renegotiation-proof strategy that is coordinated and
has strongly binary communication can be implemented whenever α is a rational number and the set of
messagesM is sufficiently large (and irrational α-s can be approximately implemented by ε-equilibria).
Observe that in the symmetric case (F (0) = 1−F (1)), σC is the essentially unique renegotiation-
proof strategy with the above two properties. Further observe that in the asymmetric case, the moderate
types gain if the extreme types with the same preferred outcome are more frequent than the extreme types
of the opposite preferred outcome. Specifically, if there are more extreme “leftists” than extreme “right-
ists” (i.e., F (0)> 1−F (1)), then the essentially unique renegotiation-proof strategy with properties of
coordination and strongly binary communication induces higher probability to coordinate on action L
(rather than on action R) whenever two moderate agents with different preferred outcomes meet.
E.7 Formal Proofs of Extensions
E.7.1 Proof of Theorem 2 (Multidimensional types, Section E.2)
The proof of Thm. 2 mimics the proof of Thm. 1 except that Lemma 2 has to be adapted somewhat as
follows (this is the only place where one uses the assumption of unambiguous coordination preferences).
Lemma 6. Assume that the atomless distribution of types have unambiguous coordination preferences.
Let σ = (µ,ξ ) be a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy. Then it is coordinated.
Proof. We need to show that for any message pair m,m′ ∈ supp(µ¯),
either ξ (m,m′)≥ sup{ϕu | µu(m)> 0} or ξ (m,m′)≤ inf{ϕu | µu(m)> 0} .
Let m,m′ ∈ supp(µ¯) and assume to the contrary that
inf{ϕu | µu(m)> 0}< ξ (m,m′)< sup{ϕu | µu(m)> 0} .
As σ is an equilibrium, we must have inf{ϕu | µu(m′)> 0} < ξ (m′,m) < sup{ϕu | µu(m′)> 0} . (Oth-
erwise the m′ message sender would play L with probability one or R with probability one, in which case
the m message sender’s best response would be to play L (or R) regardless of her type). Let x= ξ (m,m′)
and x′ = ξ (m′,m). In what follows we will show that the equilibrium (x,x′) of the game without com-
munication Γ(Fm,Fm′) is Pareto-dominated by either σL, σR, or σC (all based on ϕu instead of u).
There are three cases to be considered. Case 1: Suppose that x,x′ ≤ 1/2. We now show that in this
case the equilibrium (x,x′) is Pareto-dominated by σR. Consider the player who sent message m.
Case 1a: Consider a type u with ϕu ≤ x. Then we have
uLLFm′(x
′)+
(
1−Fm′(x
′)
)
uLR ≤ uLLFm′(
1
2)+uLR
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
≤ uLLFm′(
1
2)+uRR
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
,
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where the first expression is the type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile (x,x′) and the last expression
is her payoff under strategy profile σR. The first inequality follows from uLL ≥ uLR and Fm′(1/2)≥ Fm′(x′)
by the fact that Fm′ is nondecreasing (as it is a CDF), and the second inequality follows from uRR ≥ uLR.
This inequality is strict when uLL > uLR and Fm′(1/2)> Fm′(x′) or when uRR > uLR.
Case 1b: Now consider a type u with x< ϕu ≤ 1/2. Then we have
uRLFm′(x
′)+uRR
(
1−Fm′(x
′)
)
≤ uLLFm′(x
′)+uRR
(
1−Fm′(x
′)
)
≤ uLLFm′(
1
2)+uRR
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
,
where the first expression is the type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile (x,x′) and the last expression
is her payoff under strategy profile σR. The first inequality follows from uLL ≥ uRL and the second one
from Fm′(1/2)≥ Fm′(x′) and uLL ≥ uRR. Note also that the second inequality follows from the assumption
of unambiguous coordination preferences and ϕu ≤ 1/2. This inequality is strict when uLL > uRL or when
Fm′(1/2)> Fm′(x
′) and uLL > uRR.
Case 1c: Finally, consider a type u with ϕu > 1/2. Then we have uRR > uRLFm′(x′)+uRR (1−Fm′(x′)),
where the right-hand side is the type u agent’s payoff under (x,x′) and the left-hand side is her payoff un-
der σR. The inequality follows from the observation that uRR > uRL because uRR > uLL by the assumption
of unambiguous coordination preferences, and uLL ≥ uRL by the fact that it is a coordination game.
The analysis for the player who sent message m′ is analogous.
Case 2: Suppose that x,x′ ≥ 1/2. The analysis is analogous to Case 1 if we replace σR with σL.
Case 3: Suppose, without loss of generality for the remaining cases, that x≤ 1/2≤ x′. We show that
the equilibrium (x,x′) in this case is Pareto-dominated by σC. Consider the player who sent message m.
Case 3a: Consider a type u such that ϕu ≤ x. Then we have
uLL
[
Fm′(
1
2)+
1
2
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)]
+uRR
1
2
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
> uLLFm′(x
′)+uLR (1−Fm′(x′)) ,
where the right-hand side is the type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile (x,x′) and the left-hand side
is her payoff under strategy profile σC. The inequality follows from the observation that uRR ≥ uLR and
Fm′(x
′)≤ 1/2 by the fact that Fm′(x′) = x when (x,x′) is an equilibrium.
Case 3b: Now consider a type u with x< ϕu ≤ 1/2. Then we have
uRLFm′(x
′)+uRR
(
1−Fm′(x
′)
)
≤ uLLFm′(x
′)+uRR
(
1−Fm′(x
′)
)
≤ uLL
[1
2 +
1
2Fm′(x
′)
]
+uRR
1
2
(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
,
where the first expression is the type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile (x,x′) and the last expression
is her payoff under strategy profile σC. The first inequality follows from uLL ≥ uRL and the second
one from uLL ≥ uRR by the assumption of unambiguous coordination preferences given ϕu ≤ 1/2 and
Fm′(x
′) = x by (x,x′) being an equilibrium and x< 1/2. The inequality is strict if uLL > uRL or uLL > uRR.
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Case 3c: Finally, consider a type u with ϕu > 1/2. Then we have
uRLFm′(x
′)+uRR
(
1−Fm′(x
′)
)
< uRL
1
2Fm′(
1
2)+uRR
[(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
+ 12Fm′(
1
2)
]
≤ uLL
1
2Fm′(
1
2)+uRR
[(
1−Fm′(
1
2)
)
+ 12Fm′(
1
2)
]
,
where the first expression is a u type’s payoff under strategy profile (x,x′) and the last expression is her
payoff under strategy profile σC. The first inequality follows from uRR > uLL ≥ uRL by the assumption of
unambiguous coordination preferences and from (1−Fm′(1/2))≥ (1−Fm′(x′)) as Fm′ is nondecreasing.
The analysis for the player who sent message m′ is analogous.
E.7.2 Proof of Theorem 3 (Multiple Players, Section E.3)
The “if” part is analogous to the proof of the “if” part of Theorem 1. The proof of the “only if” part does
not extend directly and has to be adapted as follows. The following lemma states that play is coordinated
whenever all players send the same message.
Lemma 7. Let σ = (µ,ξ ) be a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy. Let m ∈ supp(µ¯) and let
m = (m, . . . ,m) be the vector with n identical entries of m, which represents the case of all n players
sending message m. Then either ξ (m)≥ sup{u | µu(m)> 0} or ξ (m)≤ inf{u | µu(m)> 0}.
Proof. Letm∈ supp(µ¯) and assume to the contrary that inf{u | µu(m)> 0}< ξ (m)< sup{u | µu(m)> 0}.
Let x= ξ (m). We now show that the symmetric equilibrium in which all players use cutoff x after send-
ing the identical message m, denoted by x= (x, . . . ,x), is equilibrium Pareto-dominated by σL or σR.
There are two cases to be considered. Case 1: Suppose that x ≤ 1/2. We now show that in this case
the equilibrium x is Pareto-dominated by σR.
Case 1a: Consider a type u≤ x. Then we have
(1−u)
(
Fm(
1
2)
)n−1
+u
(
1−
(
Fm(
1
2)
)n−1)
≥ (1−u)(Fm(x))
n−1 ,
where the left-hand side is the type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile σR and the right-hand side is
her payoff under strategy profile x. The inequality follows from u
(
1− (Fm(1/2))
n−1
)
≥ 0 and Fm(1/2)≥
Fm(x) by the fact that Fm is nondecreasing (as it is a cumulative distribution function). Note also that this
inequality is strict for all u except for u= 0 in the case of x= 1/2.
Case 1b: Now consider a type u with x< u≤ 1/2. Then we have
(1−u)
(
Fm(
1
2)
)n−1
+u
(
1−
(
Fm(
1
2)
)n−1)
≥ u
(
1− (Fm(x))
n−1
)
,
where the left-hand side is the type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile σR and the right-hand side is
her payoff under strategy profile x. The inequality follows from the fact that given u ≤ 1/2 we have that
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1−u≥ u and therefore
(1−u)
(
Fm(
1
2)
)n−1
+u
(
1−
(
Fm(
1
2)
)n−1)
≥ u.
Note that this inequality actually holds strictly for all u.
Case 1c: Finally, consider a type u > 1/2. Then we have u > u(1−Fm(x))
n−1, where the left-hand
side is the type u agent’s payoff under strategy profile σR and the right-hand side is her payoff under x.
Case 2: Suppose that x≥ 1/2. The analysis is analogous to Case 1 if we replace σR with σL.
Lemma 8. Every renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) is mutual-preference consistent.
Proof. The proof of this lemma involves two steps. In the first step we show that a renegotiation-proof
equilibrium strategy σ is ordinal preference revealing, i.e., such that for any message m ∈ supp(µ¯),
Fm(1/2) ∈ {0,1}. We then use this to show that σ is mutual-preference consistent.
Assume, first, that σ is a renegotiation-proof but not ordinal preference-revealing equilibrium strat-
egy. That is, suppose to the contrary that Fm (1/2) ∈ (0,1). Then there are types u < 1/2 as well as types
u> 1/2 who both send message m with positive probability. By Lemma 7 play after message pair (m,m)
must be either L or R. If it is L then the equilibrium strategy σL Pareto-dominates playing L, with a strict
payoff improvement for all types u > 1/2 (and unchanged payoffs for all types u ≤ 1/2). If it is R then
the equilibrium strategy σR Pareto-dominates playing R, with a strict payoff improvement for all types
u< 1/2 (and unchanged payoffs for all types u≥ 1/2).
Given a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ = (µ,ξ ), we can classify messages in the sup-
port of µ into two distinct sets, ML = ML(σ) = {m ∈ supp(µ) | Fm (1/2) = 1} and MR = MR(σ) =
{m ∈ supp(µ) | Fm (1/2) = 0}, where ML∩MR = /0 and ML∪MR = supp(µ¯).
To show that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ = (µ,ξ ) is mutual-preference consistent,
then consider any profile of types (u1,u2, . . . ,un) such that ui < 1/2 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. They must each
send a message inML, which we denote by the profilem= (m1, . . . ,mn). Any play after message profile
m that is not coordinated on L is now clearly Pareto-dominated (given that all types≤ 1/2) by playing the
equilibrium strategy L. The case for a profile of types ui > 1/2 for all players is proven analogously.
The following lemma shows that, in a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy, agents never misco-
ordinate after observing any message profile.
Lemma 9. Every renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ is coordinated.
Proof. Suppose that σ = (µ,ξ ) is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy. Given Lemmas 7 and 8 it
only remains to prove that play under σ is coordinated even after mixed messages are sent, i.e., when
there is at least one player who sends a message in ML and another player who sends a message in MR,
where ML and MR are as defined in the proof of Lemma 8. Suppose that this is the case. Then let
I ⊂ {1, . . . ,n} be the set of all players who send a message mi ∈ML. Let Ic denote its complement. By
Lemma 8 all i ∈ Ic satisfy mi ∈MR. Let xi = ξ (mi,m−i) be the cutoff used by player i after observing
20
message profile (m1,m2, . . . ,mn). Then by Lemma 8 we have xi ≤ 1/2 for all i ∈ I and xi ≥ 1/2 for all
i ∈ Ic. For this profile x = (x1, . . . ,xn) to be an equilibrium after the players observe message profile
(m1,m2, . . . ,mn), we must have that for each i = 1,2, . . . ,n, the probability that player i’s opponents
coordinate their action on L conditional on them coordinating (on either L or R) is
xi =
∏ j 6=iFm j(x j)
∏ j 6=iFm j(x j)+∏ j 6=i
(
1−Fm j(x j)
) .
But then, all types of all players, after observing message profile (m1,m2, . . . ,mn), weakly (and some
strictly) prefer to play σC, which is a payoff identical in this case to a public fair coin toss to determine
whether coordination should be on L or R. To see this, consider a player i who sent a message inML (i.e.,
ui ≤ 1/2, which implies that xi ≤ 1/2) and consider the following two cases.
Case 1: Suppose that ui ≤ xi. Under the given strategy, this type’s payoff is (1−ui)∏ j 6=iFm j(x j) with
∏ j 6=iFm j(x j) ≤ 1/2. The equilibrium strategy σC yields to this type a payoff of 1/2(1−ui)+ 1/2ui, which
exceeds the former payoff, which contradicts the supposition that σ is renegotiation-proof.
Case 2: Suppose that xi< ui≤ 1/2. Then, under the given strategy, this type’s payoff is ui∏ j 6=i
(
1−Fm j(x j)
)
.
The equilibrium σC yields to this type a payoff of 1/2(1−ui)+ 1/2ui, which, by virtue of 1−ui ≥ ui, again
exceeds the former payoff, which contradicts the supposition that σ is renegotiation-proof.
The analysis for a player who sent a message inMR is proven analogously.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1 for the case of many players, we need to prove that any
renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy also has binary communication. The proof of this statement
is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3 and therefore omitted.
E.7.3 Proof of Proposition 8 (Multiple Actions, Section E.2)
For the proof, two lemmas about approximating real numbers by rational numbers will be useful. The
first lemma shows that any discrete distribution with at least three elements in its support can be ap-
proximated from below by a vector of rational numbers, such that the profile of differences (between the
irrational exact probability and its rational approximation from below) is roughly uniform in the sense
that no difference is larger than the half the sum of all the differences.
Lemma 10. Let p ∈ ∆(A) be a distribution satisfying |supp(p)| ≥ 3. Then there exists a function q : A→
IR+ such that, for each 1≤ i≤ k, q(ai) is a rational number, q(ai)≤ p(ai), and
p(ai)−q(ai)≤
1
2 ∑1≤ j≤k
(
p
(
a j
)
−q
(
a j
))
.
Proof. Let δ < min{p(a)/2 | a ∈ supp(p)}. As the rational numbers are dense in the reals, for each
real number pˆ > δ , there exists a rational number qˆ ∈ (0, pˆ) such that pˆ− qˆ ∈ ((9/10)δ ,δ ). Call this qˆ a
rational approximation of pˆ. For each a ∈ suppp, let q(a) be a rational approximation of p(a). For each
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a 6∈ supp(p) let q(a) = q(a) = 0. Then it follows that, for each 1≤ i≤ k, q(ai) is a rational number, and
q(ai)≤ p(ai). Finally we get, for each 1≤ i≤ k, that
p(ai)−q(ai)≤ δ ≤
1
2 |supp(p)|
9
10δ ≤
1
2 ∑1≤ j≤k
(
p
(
a j
)
−q
(
a j
))
,
where the first inequality follows directly from the definition of a rational approximation, the second
one follows from the assumption that |supp(p)| ≥ 3, and the last one from the assumption that, for each
a j ∈ supp(p), p(a j)−q(a j)> (9/10)δ by the definition of a rational approximation.
Note that the closer δ is to zero, the better the rational approximation constructed in this proof. Note,
however, that this does not matter in the proof of Proposition 8 below, which simply uses any (possibly
quite rough) rational approximation.
The second lemma is utilized in the proof of Proposition 8 for the case where the distribution in
question has exactly two elements in its support.
Lemma 11. Let p,q ∈ (0,1). Then there exists a rational number α ∈ (0,1) satisfying
p−q
1−q
< α <
p
q
.
Proof. Note that, as p< 1 the following inequality holds: ≤ (p−q)2 = p2−2pq+q2 < p−2pq+q2.
The inequality 0< p−2pq+q2 then implies that
qp−q2 < p− pq⇔ q(p−q)< p(1−q)⇔
p−q
1−q
<
p
q
.
The result then follows from the fact that p−q< 1−q.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 8. Let σ = (µ,ξ ) be a renegotiation-proof equilibrium
strategy of 〈ΓA,M〉. We begin by showing that σ is same-message coordinated. Let m ∈ supp(µ¯) let
and p ∈ ∆(A) be the distribution of play under σ conditional on message pair (m,m) being observed.
Assume to the contrary that p(a)< 1 for each a ∈ A (i.e., that there is miscoordination).
Case I: Assume that |supp(p)≥ 3|. Let q : A→ IR+ be a rational approximation of p satisfying
the requirements of Lemma 10. The fact that all q(ai)-s are rational numbers implies that there are
l1, . . . , lk,n∈ IN, such that q(ai) = li/n for each i and l1+ . . .+ lk ≤ n. Consider the following equilibrium
strategy σ˜ =
(
µ˜ , ξ˜
)
of the game induced after players observe message pair (m,m) with an additional
communication round with the set of messages M˜ =
{
mB,i,b | 1≤ B≤ n, 1≤ i≤ k, b ∈ {0,1}
}
. We let
1 ≤ B ≤ n denote a random integer used for a joint lottery, 1 ≤ i ≤ k denote the index of the player’s
preferred outcome (i.e., ui = max
{
u j | 1≤ j ≤ k
}
, and b ∈ {0,1} denotes a random bit). The message
function µ˜ induces each agent to choose the indexes B and b randomly (uniformly, and independently of
each other), and to choose i such that ui =max
{
u j | 1≤ j ≤ k
}
is her preferred outcome.
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The action function ξ˜
(
mB,i,b,mB′,i′,b′
)
is defined as follows. Let Bˆ= (B+B′) mod n be the sum of
the random B-s sent by the players. Both players play action a j if l1+ . . .+ l j−1 ≤ Bˆ< l1+ . . .+ l j. If Bˆ≥
l1+ . . .+ lk, then both players play the action in {ai,ai′} with the smaller index if action if b= b′ and the
action with the larger index if b 6= b′. Strategy σ˜ induces both players to coordinate on a random action
with probability q¯≡ q(a1)+ . . .+q(ak) (and, conditional on that, the random action is chosen to be a j
with probability q
(
a j
)
/q¯), and to coordinate on the preferred action of one of the two players (chosen
uniformly at random) with probability 1− q¯, which can be written as 1− q¯= ∑1≤ j≤k
(
p
(
a j
)
−q
(
a j
))
,
by the fact that p is a probability distribution and, thus, ∑1≤ j≤k p
(
a j
)
= 1.
The proof that σ˜ is an equilibrium is analogous to the proof of Prop. 7 and thus omitted. The expected
payoff that the original equilibrium σ yields to each type u= (u1, . . . ,uk) ∈U in the game induced after
observing (m,m) is max j
{
p
(
a j
)
u j
}
. The expected payoff that σ˜ induces for each type u is at least
∑
j
q
(
a j
)
u j+
1
2 (1− q¯)max j
{
u j
}
≥max j{q
(
a j
)
u j}+
1
2max j
{
u j
}
∑ j
(
p
(
a j
)
−q
(
a j
))
.
Thus, the difference between the payoff of σ˜ and the payoff of σ for a type u is at least
1
2max j
{
u j
}
∑ j
(
p
(
a j
)
−q
(
a j
))
−
(
max j
{
p
(
a j
)
u j
}
−max j
{
q
(
a j
)
u j
})
≥
1
2max j
{
u j
}
∑ j
(
p
(
a j
)
−q
(
a j
))
− 12 ∑1≤ j≤k
(
p
(
a j
)
−q
(
a j
))
u j ≥ 0,
where the first inequality is due to
max
j
{
p
(
a j
)
u j
}
−max
j
{
q
(
a j
)
u j
}
= p(al)ul−max
j
{
q
(
a j
)
u j
}
≤ p(al)ul−q(al)ul,
where l = argmax j
{
p
(
a j
)
u j
}
; and the second inequality is due to q being a rational approximation of
p as given by Lemma 10.
This then implies that σ is post-communication equilibrium Pareto-dominated by σ˜ , which contra-
dicts the supposition that σ is a renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
Case II: We are left with the case of |supp(p)| = 2. Let supp(p) =
{
ai,a j
}
. Let q ∈ (0,1) be the
posterior probability of a player having a type u with ui ≥ u j, conditional on sending m. Let p≡ p(ai).
By Lemma 11, there exists a rational number α ≡ k/n ∈ (0,1) satisfying p−q/1−q< α < p/q. Consider the
following symmetric equilibrium σ˜ =
(
µ˜ , ξ˜
)
of the game induced after players observe message pair
(m,m) with an additional communication round with the set of messages M˜ = {i, j}×{1, . . . ,n}.
The first component of the message of each player is interpreted as her preferred coordinated outcome
of ai and a j, and the second component is a random number between 1 and n. When following strategy
σ˜ the players send message component i if and only if ui ≥ u j, send a random number between 1 and
n according to the uniform distribution, play ai after observing ((i,a) ,(i,b)) for any numbers a and b,
play a j after observing (( j,a) ,( j,b)) for any numbers a and b, play ai after observing ((i,a) ,( j,b)) if
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a+b< k mod n, and play a j after observing
(
(ai,a) ,
(
a j,b
))
if a+b≥ k mod n.
Observe that σ˜ is indeed an equilibrium of the induced game, because following any pair of messages
the players coordinate for sure, each agent with ui > u j (resp., u j > ui) strictly prefers to report that her
preferred outcome is ai (resp., a j) as this induces her to coordinate on ai (resp., a j) with a high probability
of q+α (1−q) (resp., 1−q+(1−α)q) instead of with a low probability of αq (resp., (1−q)(1−α)),
and each agent is indifferent between sending any random number, as this has no effect on the probability
of coordinating on ai (which is equal to α = k/n), given that her opponent chooses his random number
uniformly as well.
Recall that the payoff of each type who follows σ in the game induced after observing (m,m) is equal
to max
{
uip,u j(1− p)
}
. The payoff of each type u with ui ≥ u j in equilibrium σ˜ is given by
(q+α (1−q))ui+(1− (q+α (1−q)))u j > pui+(1− p)u j ≥max
{
uip,u j(1− p)
}
,
where the first inequality is implied by ui ≥ u j and
p−q
1−q < α ⇔ p< q+α (1−q).
The payoff of each type u with ui < u j in equilibrium σ˜ is given by
((1−q)+(1−α)q)u j+(1− ((1−q)+(1−α)q))ui > (1− p)u j+ pui ≥max
{
(1− p)u j, pui
}
,
where the first inequality is implied by q
p
> α ⇔ 1−α > q−p
q
⇔ (1−q)+(1−α)q> 1− p and ui < u j.
This implies that all types obtain a strictly larger payoff in σ˜ (relative to the expected payoff of σ in the
game induced after players observe message pair m,m), which implies that σ˜ Pareto-dominates σ , which
contradicts the supposition that σ is renegotiation-proof.
Next, we show that σ = (µ,ξ ) is mutual-preference consistent. For each i∈ {1, . . . ,k}, letUi⊂ [0,1]k
be the set of types such that ui ≥ max j 6=i u j. Assume, first, that σ is not ordinal preference-revealing.
That is, suppose that there is a message m ∈ supp(µ¯) such that there are action indices i, j with i 6= j
and µu(m) > 0 for some u ∈ Ui and some u ∈ U j. We have shown above that the play after players
observe (m,m) must be coordinated on some action al ∈ A. Now consider the following strategy with
new message space M˜ = {mi,m¬i} in which players of type u ∈ Ui send message mi, while all others
send m¬i and play is al unless both players send message mi, in which case it is ai. This is an equilibrium
strategy of the induced game after players observe (m,m) and it Pareto-dominates σ , a contradiction.
This proves that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ must be ordinal preference-revealing.
Given a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ = (µ,ξ ), we can classify messages in the support
of µ into k distinct sets Mi =Mi(σ) = {m ∈ supp(µ¯) | u ∈Ui} for each i = 1, . . . ,k, where for each i, j
with i 6= j Mi∩M j = /0 and
⋃k
i=1Mi = supp(µ¯).
To show that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium strategy σ is mutual-preference consistent, consider
a message pair (m,m′) with m,m′ ∈Mi for some i= 1, . . . ,k. Since σ is ordinal preference-revealing, the
updated support of types who observe either m or m′ is then inUi. But then any joint action distribution
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that the two players could play after (m,m′) is Pareto-dominated by the equilibrium of playing action ai.
E.7.4 Proof of Proposition 9 (Extreme Types, Section E.6)
Proof of Proposition 9. Any strategy σ that is coordinated, mutual-preference consistent, and has strongly
binary communication can be characterized by its left tendency (see Section 3) as follows. Under such
a mutual-preference consistent strategy players indicate whether their type is below or above 1/2. This
means that there are two disjoint sets of messages, ML and MR, such that players of type u≤ 1/2 send a
message in ML and players of type u> 1/2 send a message in MR. Also whenever two players both send
messages in ML they then play L and if both send messages in MR they both play R. The left tendency
α = ασ then describes how moderate players coordinate if one of them sends a message from ML and
the other sends a message from MR. The left tendency α is then the probability that the two players
coordinate on L (through random message selection within the respective sets of messages), while 1−α
is then the remaining probability that they coordinate on R.
To prove the “only if” part, consider an arbitrary left tendency of α ∈ [0,1]. Then consider a player
of type 1/2 who needs to be indifferent between sending a message in ML and sending a message in
MR for this strategy to be an equilibrium strategy. If she sends a message in ML she coordinates on
L whenever either her opponent sends a message in ML (which happens with probability F(1/2)), or
her moderate opponent sends a message in MR (which happens with probability F(1)−F(1/2)) and the
joint lottery yields the outcome L (which happens with probability α). By contrast, she coordinates
on R whenever her opponent sends a message in MR and the joint lottery yields the outcome R (which
happens with probability 1−α). Therefore, her expected payoff from sending a message in ML is given
by 12F
(1
2
)
+ 12α
(
F(1)−F
(1
2
))
+ 12(1−α)
(
1−F
(1
2
))
. Similarly, her expected payoff from sending a
message in MR is given by 12αF
(1
2
)
+ 12(1−α)
(
F
(1
2
)
−F (0)
)
+ 12
(
1−F
(1
2
))
. Clearly, her expected
payoff from sending a message in ML is equal to her expected payoff from sending a message in MR iff
α = F(0)/(F(0)+(1−F(1))), as required. This proves the “only if” direction.
To prove the “if” direction, we need to show that a coordinated and mutual-preference consistent
strategy with strongly binary communication and with a left tendency of α = F(0)/(F(0)+(1−F(1)))
is both an equilibrium and a renegotiation-proof strategy. To prove the latter condition the same argu-
ments as in the relevant parts of the proof of the “if” direction of Theorem 1 apply directly. It remains to
show that such a strategy is an equilibrium strategy. We have already shown that the message function
is a best reply to itself and the action function. All that remains to prove is that the action function is a
best reply to the given strategy. It is easy to see that playing L is the optimal strategy when both players
send a message in ML and thus are of type u< 1/2. In doing so, they coordinate on their most preferred
outcome with probability one. Similarly, playing R after two messages in MR is clearly optimal. Now
suppose that one player sends a message in ML and the other player sends a message in MR. There are
two possibilities. Either they are now supposed to both play L (unless they are an extreme R type) or
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they are now supposed to both play R (unless they are an extreme L type). Consider first the person who
sends a message in ML and therefore be of type u < 1/2. Suppose that the two players are expected to
coordinate on R. Since her opponent sent a message in MR, our ML sender expects R with a probability
of one (as allMR senders are of type u> 1/2, which excludes L-dominant action types). But then ourML
sender of any type u > 0 has a strict incentive to play R as well. Now suppose that the two players are
expected to coordinate on L. Then our ML sender expects her opponent to play L with a probability of
(F(1)−F(1/2))/(1−F(1/2)), which is the conditional probability of an R-type to be moderate, which
by assumption is greater than or equal to 1/2. Playing L in this case is therefore optimal for allML senders.
That the MR sender has the correct incentives in her choice of action after any mixed-message pair (one
inMR and one in ML) is proven analogously and requires the assumption that F(0)/F(1/2)≤ 1/2.
We now show when one can implement a coordinated, mutual-preference consistent strategy with bi-
nary communication with the required left tendency of α = F(0)/(F(0)+(1−F(1))). This implemen-
tation requires two things. First, α needs to be a rational number, and second, the message space needs
to be sufficiently large.21 Note that in the case of a symmetric distribution F (i.e., F (0) = 1−F (1))
the required left tendency is exactly α = 1/2 and the required strategy is σC, as described in Sec-
tion 3. More generally, let α = k/n, and assume that |M| ≥ 2n. Denote 2n distinct messages as{
mL,1, . . . ,mL,n,mR,1, . . . ,mR,n
}
∈M, where we interpret sending messages mL,i as expressing a prefer-
ence for L and sending messages mR,i as expressing a preference for R and choosing at random the num-
ber i from the set of numbers {1, . . . ,n} in the joint lottery described below. We arbitrarily interpret any
message m ∈M \
{
mL,1, . . . ,mL,n,mR,1, . . . ,mR,n
}
as equivalent to mL,1. Given message m ∈M, let i(m)
denote its associated random number, e.g., i
(
mL, j
)
= j. Let MR =
{
mR,1, . . . ,mR,n
}
and ML =M \MR.
Then σα = (µα ,ξα) can be defined as follows:
µα (u) =


1
n
mL,1+ . . .+
1
n
mL,n u≤
1
2
1
n
mR,1+ . . .+
1
n
mR,n u>
1
2 ,
ξα
(
m,m′
)
=


0 (m,m′) ∈MR×MR
0 (m,m′) 6∈ML×ML
and (i(m)+ i(m′) mod n) > k
1 otherwise.
Thus, µα induces each agent to reveal whether her preferred outcome is L or R, and to uniformly
choose a number between 1 and n. In the second stage, if both agents share the same preferred outcome
they play it. Otherwise, moderate types coordinate on L if the sum of their random numbers modulo n is
at most k, and coordinate on R otherwise. Extreme types play their strictly dominant action.
21The method for implementing a binary joint lottery of α and 1−α is based on Aumann and Maschler (1968). In order
to deal with irrational α-s one needs either to slightly weaken the result to show that there exists a renegotiation-proof ε-
equilibrium strategy (in which each type of each player gains at most ε from deviating) for any ε > 0, or to allow an infinite
set of messages or a continuous “sunspot.”
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